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ABSTRACT 
 
Accounting Scandals and Stigma by Association via Director Interlocks. (August 2005) 
Soon Lee Eugene Kang, B.S., Nanyang Technological University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Asghar Zardkoohi 
This dissertation examines the phenomenon of stigma by association between 
firms in the context of corporate accounting scandals. I draw from the social psychology 
literature to develop a theoretical framework that supports the notion of director 
interlocks as a channel in which associated firms may experience stigma. I argue that 
allegations of corporate accounting scandal generate attributional search by investors to 
determine the cause(s) of the alleged scandal. Attribution theory suggests that investors 
are likely to attribute responsibility to corporate boards for failing to detect and prevent 
these scandals. Investors’ perceptions of incompetent and/or unwilling directors in firms 
accused of accounting scandals may then spill over to directorship positions in 
associated firms, resulting in the stigmatization of these associated firms. The results 
strongly support the above arguments.  
I further adopted an information-based approach to argue that firms associated 
with stigmatized firms will experience different amounts of stigma, and some firms may 
experience no stigma at all. I applied social inference theories and agency theory to 
develop four categories of variables that may influence the amount of stigma 
experienced by associated firms. The results of the dissertation present strong evidence 
 
 iv
in support of most of the hypotheses. The characteristics of the interlocking director, the 
characteristics of the board, the strength of the director interlock, and the quality of 
corporate governance in an associated firm appear to influence the amount of stigma 
experienced by the associated firm.  
This dissertation highlights the possible (1) negative consequences of director 
interlocks, (2) understatement of the social costs of corporate accounting scandals, and 
(3) need for response strategies to mitigate the negative consequences of stigma by 
association. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent surge in accounting scandals in the United States has been a cause of 
concern for public policy makers, investors, employees, and the society as a whole. 
According to the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) 2003 Annual Report, 
enforcement actions increased by approximately 42% from 477 cases in 1998 to 679 
cases in 2003. This is equivalent to an average of one enforcement action for every 32 
publicly-traded firms in the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stock exchanges in 1998 
compared with two enforcement actions for the same number of publicly-traded firms in 
2003. Significant enforcement actions listed in the SEC’s 2003 Annual Report include 
widely publicized corporate accounting scandals originating from Enron, Xerox, Qwest, 
HealthSouth, and AIG. Corporate scandals (whether accounting or non-accounting in 
nature) have also captured the interests of researchers in business, economics, sociology 
and psychology. Not surprisingly, various terminologies, such as corporate illegal act, 
corporate crime, corporate wrongdoing, and white-collar crime, have all been used in 
this stream of research. 
One way to categorize this eclectic stream of literature is to examine the research 
questions studied. Three broad research questions have dominated this literature: (1) 
what are the antecedents of corporate scandals, (2) how effective are deterrents of 
corporate scandals, and (3) what are the consequences of corporate scandals? 
_______________________ 
This dissertation follows the style and format of the Academy of Management Journal. 
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The predominant focus has been on the first question. Various antecedents have 
been associated with the number or incidence of corporate scandals, such as firm 
profitability (Staw & Szwajkowski, 1975), board of director composition (Beasley, 
1996), type of control system (Hill, Kelley, Agle, Hitt, & Hoskisson, 1992), ownership 
structure (Alexander & Cohen, 1999), level of executive compensation (Bilimoria, 
1995), environmental dynamism (Baucus & Near, 1991), and other environmental and 
organizational characteristics (McKendall & Wagner, 1997). An important finding is 
that the significance of antecedents is dependent on the type of scandal, hence 
precluding any generalizations across studies. 
The second and third research questions have received lesser attention when 
compared with the first question. Researchers studying the second question have 
examined the effectiveness of market and regulatory penalties as deterrents of corporate 
scandals (Alexander, Arlen, & Cohen, 1999; Bromiley & Marcus, 1989). Although the 
question of deterrence is an interesting one, it should be secondary to the third question 
on the consequences of corporate scandals. This is because deterrence is important only 
if the consequence of a scandal is negative and significant. Therefore, my dissertation 
shall address the third research question on the consequences of corporate scandals. Prior 
studies have largely examined the consequences of corporate scandals on the firms that 
committed the scandal (Alexander, 1999; Baucus & Baucus, 1997; Karpoff & Lott, 
1993; Reichert, Lockett, & Rao, 1996). The possibility of the consequences of corporate 
scandals extending to other firms has been neglected. This is an important oversight that 
needs to be addressed. 
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One consequence of corporate scandals is a reputational penalty borne by firms. 
Several studies have measured reputational penalty using the estimated abnormal stock 
returns for the firms about which reports of corporate scandal appeared in public news 
sources (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff & Lott, 1993). In general, these studies find that 
initial press reports of alleged or actual scandal correspond with statistically significant 
and economically meaningful losses in equity value. These losses also vary according to 
the type of scandal. The reputational penalty from a scandal is indicative of a firm’s 
“spoiled image,” a term used by Sutton and Callahan (1987) in reference to stigma. 
Since firms do not exist in isolation but are embedded in networks of relationships with 
other firms, it is plausible that a stigmatized firm may “infect” other firms through 
associations in the corporate networks. This phenomenon of stigma by association has 
been studied in the context of interpersonal relationships (Goldstein & Johnson, 1997; 
Mehta & Farina, 1988; Neuberg, Smith, Hoffman, & Russell, 1994; Swim, Ferguson, & 
Hyers, 1999), but has been neglected in the context of inter-organizational relationships. 
I seek to address the following research questions in this dissertation: 
1. Do publicly listed firms associated by director interlock(s) with other firms 
stigmatized from alleged corporate accounting scandals also experience stigma? 
2. What factors will influence the amount of stigma experienced by the associated 
firms? 
I focus my dissertation on alleged corporate accounting scandals within the 
purview of the SEC given that reputational penalties vary according to the type of 
scandals (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff & Lott, 1993). Research in this area has a higher 
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likelihood of generating interest because accounting scandals have captured the attention 
of the public. Although researchers have found that firms experience a reputational 
penalty, or stigma, as a result of alleged corporate accounting scandals (Karpoff & Lott, 
1993), no studies to my knowledge have examined the plausibility that reputational 
penalty, or stigma, may also be experienced by associated firms through the network of 
interlocking directors. In other words, the phenomenon of stigma by association has not 
been examined in the context of corporate accounting scandals. 
I assert that the network of interlocking directors is one channel in which stigma 
may be experienced by firms associated with other firms stigmatized by an alleged 
accounting scandal. Two firms are said to be connected by a director interlock when a 
person affiliated with one firm sits on the corporate board of the other firm (Mizruchi, 
1996). Although firms may also be associated through common industry membership, 
parent-subsidiary relations, or strategic alliances, just to name a few, I focus on director 
interlocks because prior studies on director interlocks have not examined the role of 
interlocks in facilitating the incidence of stigma by association (Gulati & Westphal, 
1999; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Stearns & Mizruchi, 1986). Furthermore, the 
recent accounting scandals have cast some doubts on the effectiveness of directors in 
preventing such scandals. As a result, the market may perceive common directorships as 
a channel through which misleading accounting practices may diffuse from one firm to 
another. 
I draw from the social psychology literature to develop a theoretical framework 
that supports the notion of director interlocks as a channel in which associated firms may 
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experience stigma. My primary argument is that allegations of corporate accounting 
scandal generate attributional search by investors to determine the cause(s) of the alleged 
scandal because these allegations are unexpected and likely to have severe 
consequences. Attribution theory suggests that investors are likely to attribute 
responsibility to corporate boards for failing to detect and prevent these scandals, rather 
than to external circumstances beyond the control of the directors. These attributions of 
responsibility may be accompanied by investors’ perceptions of incompetent and/or 
unwilling directors to monitor top executives. Investors’ perceptions of incompetent 
and/or unwilling directors in firms accused of accounting scandals may then spill over to 
these individuals’ directorship positions in associated firms. As a result, investors may 
anticipate a greater likelihood of associated firms adopting misleading accounting 
practices or deviating from other normative expectations because of the perceived 
ineffective board vigilance. Hence, the primary mechanism for associated firms 
experiencing stigma is the spillover effects of investors’ attributions on the interlocking 
director(s) that connect the stigmatized and associated firms. Evidence for the presence 
of stigma by association may be gathered by examining the stock price movements of 
the associated firms when allegations of accounting scandals are announced for the 
stigmatized firms. A significant decline in the market value of the associated firms 
suggests that these firms have been stigmatized. 
In the following chapters, I provide a brief literature review on the concepts of 
stigma and stigma by association. Next, I develop a theoretical framework on how 
associated firms may experience stigma because of their interlocks with other firms 
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stigmatized by an alleged accounting scandal. Furthermore, I discuss the various factors 
that may mitigate or intensify the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. 
Testable hypotheses will be presented along with the methodology on sample/data 
collection and statistical analyses. Finally, I discuss the results and end with the 
contributions of the dissertation as well as avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Stigma is an attribute that is deeply discrediting (Goffman, 1963). Despite the 
multitude of research since Goffman’s (1963) seminal work, there is still no single 
accepted definition of stigma. The lack of consensus may be attributed to the multi-
disciplinary nature of this research stream and the enormous array of circumstances to 
which the stigma concept has been applied (Link & Phelan, 2001). Hence, it is 
imperative that the concept of stigma be clearly defined in the context of the research 
topic. 
What Is Stigma? 
Stigma is a social phenomenon that exists in networks of relationships. In this 
dissertation, I draw on the definition of stigma from the book “Social Stigma: The 
Psychology of Marked Relationships” by Jones et al. (1984). According to Jones et al. 
(1984), stigma occurs when an individual with a perceived or inferred condition of 
deviation from norms is linked to dispositions that discredit the individual through an 
attributional process.1 Hence, there are three main conditions for stigma to occur. First, 
there must be a deviation from norms. An individual does not have to actually deviate 
from norms, since it is sufficient that a deviation be perceived or inferred from the 
                                                 
1 Jones et al. (1984) adopted a broad definition of norms, which may be physical or behavioral. This is 
consistent with Goffman’s (1963) notion that stigma may be from abominations of the body or 
blemishes of individual character. Extant studies also recognize that an individual may perceive himself 
or herself to have been stigmatized even though external parties have not stigmatized the individual (see 
Link and Phelan (2001) for a review). However, this dissertation is concerned with the actual 
stigmatization of others, i.e., stigma conferred by one actor on another actor. 
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circumstances. Second, the deviation from norms causes another individual to attribute 
certain dispositions to the deviant. Third, stigma has a negative consequence, 
specifically a spoiled identity (or image) that discredits the deviant. A spoiled identity 
may induce negative attitudes toward and lower levels of comfort with the stigmatized 
individual (Goldstein & Johnson, 1997).  
Although Jones et al. (1984) examined stigma in the context of social interactions 
between individuals, their definition of stigma may be applied to the organizational 
level. This is because organizations are also embedded in structures of social relations 
(Granovetter, 1985) and experience normative pressures to conform (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). Organizations that deviate from normative expectations may 
result in the attribution of dispositions that discredit the organizations (Lievens & 
Highhouse, 2003; Slaughter, Zickar, Highhouse, & Mohr, 2004) and the subsequent loss 
of legitimacy conferred by important stakeholders (Edelman, 1990; Palmer, Jennings, & 
Zhou, 1993). 
What Is Stigma by Association? 
Stigma by association refers to a situation when a social actor is stigmatized 
because of the actor’s association with a stigmatized actor. Goffman (1963) refers to this 
as “courtesy stigma.” According to Goffman (1963), one form of courtesy stigma is 
when an individual is related through the social structure to a stigmatized individual, 
such as the wife, husband, or children of an ex-convict or the loyal spouse of a mental 
patient. In such situations, the associated individual(s) share some of the discredit of the 
stigmatized individual. The negative consequence of stigma by association has received 
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legislative acknowledgments in the United States. For instance, section 102(b)(4) of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) protects qualified individuals from being denied 
equal jobs or benefits as a result of a known relationship or association with a disabled 
individual. 
Since Goffman’s (1963) work, there has been some discussion on how 
individuals experience stigma as a result of their association with stigmatized 
individuals. According to Neuberg et al. (1994), there are two possible mechanisms for 
stigma by association to occur. One mechanism is that individuals associated with 
stigmatized individuals are perceived to have also deviated from norms and linked to 
dispositions that discredit the associated individual. Another mechanism is that 
individuals are stigmatized simply because of their association with stigmatized 
individuals, and not because the former is perceived to have deviated from any norms. In 
this instance, associated individuals are stigmatized because of the negative reactions 
directed at the associated individuals’ apparent tolerance toward the stigmatized 
individuals as evidenced by the company the associated individuals willfully keep 
(Gaines, 2001; Snyder, Omoto, & Crain, 1999). Alternatively, stigma by association may 
be affect-driven, where associated individuals are stigmatized because negative affect 
toward stigmatized individuals is also directed toward associated individuals (Griffitt, 
1970; Kenworthy, Canales, Weaver, & Miller, 2003).  
Despite the extensive research in the topic of stigma by association (Goldstein & 
Johnson, 1997; Mehta & Farina, 1988; Neuberg et al., 1994; Swim et al., 1999), further 
inquiry into the mechanisms and content of stigma by association appears necessary 
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(Goldstein & Johnson, 1997; Hebl & Mannix, 2003; Jones et al., 1984). For instance, 
Jones et al. (1984: 71) commented that the reasons why stigma by association occurs are 
strange and not at all easy to understand. More than a decade later, Goldstein and 
Johnson noted that “further inquiry into the mechanism…of stigma by association seems 
necessary…for a more complete understanding of impression formation processes” 
(1997: 503). 
Why Is the Study of Stigma Important? 
While social psychologists have applied the stigma concept to individuals in a 
wide variety of circumstances such as exotic dancing, mental illness, unemployment, 
sexual preferences, and stereotypes, just to name a few (see Link and Phelan (2001) for a 
comprehensive review), management scholars have largely failed to examine stigma in 
an organizational context. A search in the social sciences citation index identified a total 
of 5,930 articles from 1966 to 2004 with the term “stigma” (or related terms such as 
stigmatizing, stigmatized etc.) in the article title, keywords, or abstract. However, a 
restricted search of the social sciences citation index on key management journals2 
identified only three articles (i.e., Ashforth and Kreiner (1999), Heilman, Block, and 
Stathatos (1997), Sutton and Callahan (1987)) within the same period. Research interest 
by management scholars does appear to be increasing in light of a recent call for papers 
by the Academy of Management Review journal on the topic of stigma and 
stigmatization. 
                                                 
2 Academy of Management Executive, Academy of Management Journal, Academy of Management 
Review, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, 
Management Science, Organization Science, and Strategic Management Journal. 
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The lack of interest by management scholars is somewhat disconcerting given 
that stigma is a widely studied phenomenon by scholars in other fields. Even more 
surprising is that the application of stigma to organizations has been given cursory 
attention. To my knowledge, in the management literature the term stigma has been 
directly applied only to describe corporate bankruptcy (Sutton & Callahan, 1987). Yet, 
the concept of stigma plausibly embraces more than corporate bankruptcy. For instance, 
the public press has used the term stigma to describe the recent accounting scandals in 
the United States (Beauprez, 2003). 
Stigma is an important topic in organizational research because it has negative 
consequences not only for firms, but also for the upper echelons3 who manage these 
firms.4 An important consequence is that the market value of a firm may decline as a 
result of a stigmatizing event (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff & Lott, 1993). One reason for 
the decline in market value may be the loss of legitimacy for the stigmatized firm. 
Suchman defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (1995: 597). In support of Suchman’s 
definition, Deephouse (1996) found that conformity with a socially constructed system 
of norms and values is positively associated with organizational legitimacy. Since 
stigmatized firms have deviated from norms, it follows that their legitimacy may be 
challenged by external constituents. A loss of legitimacy may decrease firm survival and 
                                                 
3  Upper echelons are defined as the top executives and outside directors that sit on the corporate board of 
a firm. 
4 Stigma also has consequences for employees other than the upper echelons (Heilman et al., 1997). 
However, these consequences are not within the scope of this dissertation. 
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performance (Ruef & Scott, 1998; Singh, Tucker, & House, 1986; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 
2002). For instance, the market value of stigmatized firms may decline because existing 
customers and suppliers have terminated or reduced the value of their transactions with 
these firms.  
Another reason for the decline in market value may be that the market discounts 
the higher expected costs of hiring able and prestigious top executives and directors to 
manage the stigmatized firm. There is some evidence that a firm’s image is positively 
associated with its attractiveness as an employer (Belt & Paolillo, 1982; Gatewood, 
Gowan, & Lautenschlager, 1993; Lievens & Highhouse, 2003; Turban & Cable, 2003). 
Hence, potential top executives and directors may be less willing to associate themselves 
with a stigmatized firm, perhaps for fear of damaging their own reputations. For 
instance, Dutton and Dukerich (1991) found that individuals’ self concepts and personal 
identities are shaped by how they believe others view the organization for which they 
work. Furthermore, stigmatized firms are riskier to manage or harder to turnaround 
because they are naturally at a disadvantage when compared with their non-stigmatized 
counterparts. A pay premium to attract competent top executives and directors may be 
required given the increased risk of managing a stigmatized firm and the potential 
damage to managerial reputation.  
Other than a decline in firm value, stigma also has potential consequences for the 
incumbent upper echelons of a firm. Top executives and directors of stigmatized firms 
may be blamed for failing to prevent the stigmatizing event (Boeker, 1992; Meindl, 
1990), or worse, they may be viewed as being responsible for the stigmatizing event 
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(Farrell & O'Donnell, 2002; Frank, 2004). For instance, Sutton and Callahan (1987) 
found that an organizational image is closely intertwined with the image of its corporate 
leaders. If an organization is a reflection of its upper echelons (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984), then upper echelons blamed for the negative consequences of stigmatizing events 
may suffer from potential settling up consequences such as reduced compensation or a 
damaged reputation. 
Although stigma has negative consequences, the adverse impact of stigma may 
be mitigated through the actions of corporate leaders (Karpovich, 2002; King, 1991). 
Hence, the study of stigma is also important because researchers may shed light on the 
effectiveness of various organizational strategies used proactively to avoid 
stigmatization or to reduce the negative consequences when stigmatized. Several 
researchers have discussed and examined the strategies that organizations adopt to regain 
lost legitimacy as a result of stigmatizing events (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Neu & 
Wright, 1992; Suchman, 1995). For example, Neu and Wright (1992) described how the 
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) was stigmatized due to the failure 
of the Canadian Commercial Bank in 1985 and how the CICA responded as a group to 
mitigate the damage from the stigma and to re-establish legitimacy. Similarly, Elsbach 
and Sutton (1992) examined how organizations may use impression management 
techniques to gain organizational legitimacy after illegitimate events were attributed to 
members of these organizations.  
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CHAPTER III 
STIGMATIZATION OF THE ASSOCIATED FIRM 
 
In this chapter, I draw upon the social psychology literature to explain the 
phenomenon of stigma by association at the inter-organizational level. In particular, I 
apply social inference theories (i.e., theories of attributions, member-to-group inferences 
and social exchange reciprocity) that examine how individuals draw inferences about 
others in a social setting. In general, social inference occurs when an individual arrives 
at a conclusion from a set of premises by connecting these premises to the conclusion 
through the application of rules, principles, templates, or procedures (Hastie, 1983). 
Social inference theories are relevant because investors’ impression formation process 
requires them to draw inferences about other firms associated with stigmatized firms. 
Furthermore, these inferences need not be accurate, but may be colored by biases 
stemming from cognitive efficiencies or motivational reasons, biases that are explicitly 
recognized by social inference scholars. 
First, I establish that publicly listed firms accused of accounting scandals can be 
considered to be stigmatized by investors. Thereafter, I examine the importance of 
director interlocks as a channel by which associated firms experience stigma. Finally, I 
apply theories concerning attributions, member-to-group inferences, and social exchange 
reciprocity to explain why associated firms experience stigma through the director 
interlocks. 
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Stigma from Corporate Accounting Scandals 
I assert that investors stigmatize publicly listed firms alleged to have adopted 
misleading accounting practices. This dissertation focuses on investors as the 
stakeholder of interest because stigma, like reputation, is conferred by stakeholders, and 
hence may vary by stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Thompson, 1967). There 
are at least two reasons why investors are important stakeholders in the context of 
accounting scandals. First, accounting scandals are first and foremost crimes against 
investors. The primary purpose of these scandals is to mislead current and/or potential 
investors by promulgating a false representation of the financial well-being of a firm. In 
addition, some accounting practices are designed to conceal the misappropriations of 
investor wealth by top executives for personal gain. Second, the ownership structure of 
public firms has changed radically over the years. Institutional investors, such as mutual 
funds and pension funds, in the United States have increased their ownership holdings of 
U.S. firms from about 14% in 1965 to about 53% in 2003 (Federal Reserve Statistical 
Release, 2004). This increase in institutional ownership has been cited as one of the 
reasons for the rise in investor activism, which is the use of power by an investor to 
influence organizational processes or outcomes (Davis & Thompson, 1994; Ryan & 
Schneider, 2002). Hence, focusing on investors may be justified on the premise that their 
significance as a stakeholder group appears to be increasing. 
The three conditions for stigma highlighted by Jones et al. (1984) must be 
satisfied for accounting scandals to result in stigmatization. First, there must be an actual 
or perceived deviation from a norm. Publicly listed firms are expected to present their 
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financial positions to investors in conformity with the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) developed by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commision in the United States. Conformity with the U.S. GAAP is not only a 
normative expectation by the investing public, but also a regulatory requirement with 
legal sanctions for noncompliance. Publicly listed firms have deviated from investors’ 
normative expectations when they are alleged to have adopted misleading accounting 
practices. Although these allegations may eventually be refuted, the first condition for 
stigma is satisfied at the time of these allegations as long as a deviation from normative 
expectations has been perceived.  
Second, the actual or perceived deviation from a norm must cause investors to 
attribute certain dispositions to the firm. Although researchers tend to focus on human 
dispositions (House, Shane, & Herold, 1996; Mischel & Shoda, 1998), parallels have 
been drawn in other areas of research. For instance, management researchers have 
discussed organizational dispositions (Staw, 1991), and have applied the concept to 
organizations, especially to person-organization fit in recruitment studies. For instance, 
Lievens and Highhouse (2003) found that job applicants are attracted to an organization 
on the basis of the symbolic meanings (such as sincerity, innovativeness, and 
competence) that they associate with the organization. Furthermore, Slaughter et al. 
(2004) recently developed an instrument that measures perceived organizational 
personality (i.e., the set of human personality characteristics perceived to be associated 
with an organization). Hence, when a publicly listed firm’s financial statements are seen 
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as potentially misleading (a deviation from a norm), investors may attribute certain 
dispositions, such as dishonesty, to the firm.  
Third, stigma must be accompanied by a negative consequence. If a publicly 
listed firm with potentially misleading accounting practices has a spoiled identity that 
discredits the firm, then one response is for investors to sell their stake in the firm and 
invest their capital elsewhere. Hence, the market value of a firm should experience a 
significant decline as a result of the spoiled identity. Empirical evidence supports this 
assertion. For instance, Karpoff and Lott (1993) found that firms experience a 
statistically significant 4.66% decline in market value over a two-day event window in 
response to announcements of financial reporting fraud. The authors also found that the 
potential or actual legal penalties imposed on firms accused or found guilty of fraud 
account for less than 7% of the loss in the market value, with most of the loss 
attributable to these firms’ lost reputation. 
Director Interlocks as a Form of Network Association 
Although researchers have examined firms stigmatized by actual or alleged 
corporate scandals, the impact of alleged corporate scandals on other firms associated 
with the stigmatized firms has been overlooked. Given that the phenomenon of stigma 
by association is well established by social psychologists at the individual level of 
analysis, it is plausible that stigma by association also exists at the inter-organizational 
level of analysis. However, there is no theoretical framework to explain how associated 
firms may experience stigma. A theory of stigma by association at the inter-
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organizational level of analysis must begin by identifying how firms are associated with 
other firms.  
Network studies provide an excellent source to examine the types of associations 
between firms. For instance, firms may be associated through a director interlock 
(Mizruchi, 1996), parent-subsidiary network (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2001), strategic alliance (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996), supplier-
customer network (Uzzi & Gillespie, 2002), common geographic location (Davis & 
Greve, 1997; Rice & Aydin, 1991), common industry (Huff, 1982; Li & Berta, 2002), or 
common professional association (Newell & Swan, 1995; Swan & Newell, 1995). 
In this dissertation, I focus on interlocking directorates as an important conduit 
by which associated firms experience stigma. An interlocking directorate occurs when a 
person affiliated with one organization sits on the corporate board of another 
organization (Mizruchi, 1996). Director interlocks establish a form of social ties between 
firms, hence creating a social network in which firms are embedded. Network research 
on interlocking directorates has identified three types of interlocks (Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002; Palmer, Barber, Zhou, & Soysal, 1995). First, direct incoming 
interlocks (or received interlocks) occur when an executive employee of another firm is 
a director in a focal firm. Second, direct outgoing interlocks (or sent interlocks) occur 
when an executive employee of a focal firm is a director of another firm. Third, indirect 
interlocks (or neutral interlocks) occur when a third-party director sits on the boards of 
two or more firms, but is not an executive employee in any of these firms. In this 
dissertation, received and neutral interlocks represent outside directors in stigmatized 
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firms, while sent interlock represents top executives of a stigmatized firm acting as 
outside directors in an associated firm. 
I chose to study interlocking directorates instead of other types of associations 
between firms for the following reasons. First, director interlocks are important channels 
by which associated firms experience stigma because corporate boards have the 
responsibility to monitor the top executives on behalf of investors. The perceived failure 
of directors to discharge this responsibility may extend to directorships in other firms. 
Hence, there is reason to believe that stigma from alleged accounting scandals may be 
experienced by associated firms through the interlocking directorates. 
Second, although the significance of director interlocks has been established by 
many studies, researchers have not examined the role of director interlocks in the context 
of stigma by association. There is empirical evidence that director interlocks influence 
firm behavior. Interlocking directors serve as information conduits that facilitate learning 
between firms, resulting in the spread of poison pills (Davis, 1991), isomorphism in 
corporate strategies and corporate political behavior (Mizruchi, 1993; Westphal & 
Fredrickson, 2001), and premiums paid on corporate acquisitions (Beckman & 
Haunschild, 2002). Extant studies mainly focus on the intended consequences of these 
interlocks, such as to co-opt elements of the environment, to serve as a social 
infrastructure for elite cohesion, and to provide for information flow that transmit social 
norms, values, and strategies (Mizruchi, 1996). Unfortunately, the unintended 
consequences of director interlocks have been ignored. This dissertation examines one 
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such unintended consequence of director interlocks: director interlocks facilitating the 
experience of stigma by associated firms. 
Stigmatization Through Director Interlocks 
Research in social psychology has found that stigma by association occurs 
because an individual associated with a stigmatized individual is perceived also to have 
deviated from norms and is linked to dispositions that discredit the associated individual 
(Neuberg et al., 1994). This reason may also be applied to stigma by association between 
firms linked by director interlocks. Specifically, investors may perceive that firms 
associated with stigmatized firms may have deviated from some norms. I argue that the 
foundation for these perceptions derives from the investors’ expectations of corporate 
boards. 
One important normative role for corporate boards is the monitoring of top 
executives in publicly listed firms (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996). Agency theorists 
contend that board monitoring is crucial given that the separation of ownership and 
control has led to the divergence of interests between the top executives that run the firm 
and the owners of the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This misalignment of interests 
between top executives and investors in public firms has spurred much research on how 
agency costs may be mitigated through the adoption of governance mechanisms (Dalton, 
Daily, Certo, & Roengpitya, 2003; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999). A firm’s corporate board is one such mechanism. 
The normative expectations of the general public are consistent with the 
assertions of agency theorists. Corporate boards remain an important governance 
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mechanism to combat possible opportunistic behavior of top executives. For instance, 
the recent accounting scandals were accompanied by a blitz of media coverage on the 
alleged failings of corporate boards (Farrell & O'Donnell, 2002). Furthermore, public 
pressure has resulted in several legislative and regulatory actions to improve the quality 
of corporate boards. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires all board audit committee 
directors to be independent. In addition, the major stock exchanges in the United States 
require a majority of independent directors in listed firms. Hence, the effectiveness of 
corporate boards is likely to feature prominently in investors’ impression formation 
process because of the boards’ normative obligation to monitor top executives. 
The normative obligation of corporate boards to monitor top executives provides 
the basis to explain why associated firms experience stigma. Top executives have been 
charged with and found responsible for the recent accounting scandals (Forelle, 2004; 
Frank, 2004). Public attention has turned to the alleged failings of corporate boards to 
prevent these scandals. Not only has the corporate board, as a whole, been blamed for 
failing to monitor top executives, individual directors have also been accused of 
oversight by the mass media (Farrell & O'Donnell, 2002). Since mass media contents 
have been shown to influence readers’ perceptions (Bateman, Sakano, & Fujita, 1992; 
Gunther, 1998; Zillmann, Gibson, Sundar, & Perkins, 1996), the increased scrutiny on 
individual directors may be accompanied by attributions of incompetence or 
unwillingness of individual directors to monitor top executives in firms accused of 
accounting scandals. Given that some individual directors also hold directorship 
positions in other firms, investors’ attribution of incompetence or unwillingness may 
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spill over to these associated firms. In other words, investors’ attributions may lead them 
to expect each interlocking director to exhibit similar behavior and attitude in the 
associated firms. The perceived ineffectiveness of each interlocking director contributes 
to an impression of weak board vigilance in the associated firms. As a result, investors 
are more likely to perceive the associated firms as having deviated from some norms 
because the corporate boards are viewed as less able to discharge their normative 
obligations to monitor top executives. Attribution theory, a class of social inference 
theories, may be used to provide theoretical support for the above assertions. 
Attribution theory. Attribution theory attempts to explain the factors involved 
in perceived causation in order to understand the perceived causes of one’s own or 
others’ behaviors (Harvey & Weary, 1984). Attributional analyses begin with an 
outcome that is followed by a search to determine the cause(s) of the outcome. 
According to Kelly and Michela (1980), the perceived causality (either internal or 
external causes) is influenced by the information available to, as well as the beliefs and 
motivation of, the perceiver. Furthermore, the perceived causality generates affective 
responses in the perceiver and influences perceiver expectations, eventually leading to 
behavioral responses by the perceiver (Graham & Weiner, 1991; Schmidt & Weiner, 
1988; Weiner, Nierenberg, & Goldstein, 1976; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988).  
Attribution theory may be used to explain investors’ impression formation 
process since the theory examines the perception of causation and the consequences of 
such perception (Kelly & Michela, 1980). Attribution theory is also relevant since 
unexpected negative outcomes (such as alleged accounting scandals) are likely to initiate 
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attributional search (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1981; Weiner, 1986). Since this 
dissertation focuses on investors’ perceptions of associated firms, I refer to theories of 
social attributions5 instead of self attributions. 
Attribution theory may be used to explain the process of attributing responsibility 
for alleged accounting scandals. Investors may attribute responsibility to a director for 
failing to monitor the top executives who may have orchestrated these alleged 
accounting scandals. Alternatively, investors may direct their attributions to external 
circumstances that are outside of a director’s control. If investors’ attributions for alleged 
accounting scandals focus on external circumstances outside of a director’s control 
instead of internal causes specific to the director, then stigma by association between 
firms will not occur through director interlocks. However, several researchers in social 
psychology have established a bias in the attribution process, henceforth referred to as 
the fundamental attribution bias, where observers tend to overestimate internal causes 
and underestimate external causes when explaining an outcome, especially negative 
outcomes for others (Jones, Kanouse, Kelley, Nisbett, & Valms, 1972; Ross, 1977). 
Some researchers suggest that the fundamental attribution bias exists because of a social 
norm that favors internal attributions (Jellison & Green, 1981). Other researchers suggest 
that observers tend to underestimate situational causes in attributional analyses because 
unlike individuals, situations have little or no physical manifestations and are more 
likely to be passed over (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Synder & Jones, 1974). Cognitive 
efficiencies also appear to contribute to the occurrence of the fundamental attribution 
                                                 
5  Social attributions are attributions of others instead of the self. 
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bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). An individual and the individual’s actions form a more 
natural categorical unit that is automatically perceived with the least amount of cognitive 
effort (Heider & Simmel, 1944) when compared with the individual’s actions and the 
circumstances as a categorical unit, which requires greater effort and a more systematic 
approach (Heider, 1958; Jones, 1979). Hence, attributions may be viewed as an anchor 
and adjustment inferential process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), where observers first 
assume that actions are the result of an individual’s disposition (i.e., the anchor), and 
then subsequently adjust for situational pressures, if at all (Gilbert, 1991; Gilbert, 
Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Jones, 1979; Quattrone, 1982). In short, fundamental attribution 
bias suggests that investors will attribute responsibility to a director regardless of 
whether the prevention of accounting scandal is or is not within the control of the 
director. 
Research on defensive attribution of responsibility also supports the assertion 
that investors are likely to hold a director responsible for alleged accounting scandals. 
Defensive attribution of responsibility refers to the notion that as the severity of the 
outcome of an action increases, the responsibility attributed to an individual increases 
(Robbennolt, 2000). Researchers also found that defensive attributions are more likely to 
be triggered when the situation is highly relevant and salient to the observer (Shaver, 
1970). According to Fiske and Taylor (1991), defensive attribution is motivated by self-
protection, where attributing responsibility to an individual makes the outcome seem 
somehow controllable, and accordingly, avoidable by the observer. Investors may 
exhibit defensive attribution and attribute more responsibility to a director because 
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accounting scandals are highly relevant due to the negative consequences on investor 
wealth. Defensive attribution also gives investors some degree of control by providing 
the impetus for investor activism to avoid future scandals. There is anecdotal evidence 
that investor activism has increased in response to corporate scandals (Browning, 2002; 
Plitch & Cowan, 2003). 
Another reason why investors are likely to attribute responsibility for alleged 
accounting scandals to a director may be found in the “romance of leadership” literature 
(Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). The “romance of leadership” views leadership as 
an explanatory category to which attributions are made to account for a variety of 
organizational events and occurrences (Meindl, 1990). In brief, because organizations 
are highly complex systems, observers’ attributions of the causes of organizational 
outcomes are likely to reflect a process of simplification. In particular, Meindl et al. 
(1985) found that leadership is a highly valued concept in the thought systems that 
observers use to explain organizational outcomes. Specifically, corporate leaders stand a 
good chance of being blamed when things turn out badly, even if they are not directly 
responsible for the outcome. Although the “romance of leadership” studies have focused 
on the top executives of a firm, there is reason to believe that observer bias in 
attributions of organizational outcomes also applies to corporate boards. This is because 
directors, like top executives, are not only responsible for organizational outcomes, but 
also make decisions that affect these outcomes (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). In the 
context of alleged accounting scandals, although a director is not directly responsible for 
these scandals, the director is responsible for monitoring the top executives who may 
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have orchestrated these scandals. Hence, the “romance of leadership” literature suggests 
that investors are likely to attribute responsibility to a director for alleged accounting 
scandals. 
In short, attribution theory supports the assertion that investors are likely to 
attribute responsibility for alleged accounting scandals to a director. In other words, 
investors perceive each director in a firm accused of an accounting scandal as 
responsible for not monitoring top executives effectively. The perception of a director as 
an ineffective monitor may extend to other firms where the director holds directorship 
positions. As a result, investors are more likely to expect an associated firm as having 
deviated from some norms because the perceived ineffectiveness of the interlocking 
director contributes to a less vigilant board in the associated firm. However, the 
interlocking director is only one board member in an associated firm. The amount of 
stigma experienced by an associated firm may not be significant if there are other 
directors, who are independent, able, and willing to monitor top executives in the 
associated firm. But social inference theories have established shortcomings in social 
judgments (Hastie, 1983; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). There is theoretical and empirical 
support for the phenomenon of making generalizations from one individual in a group 
(i.e. the interlocking director) to the entire group (i.e. the corporate board). If investors’ 
perception of an ineffective interlocking director spill over to the entire board of an 
associated firm, then the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm is likely to 
be more significant. Below, I delineate the theoretical perspectives that support this 
assertion. 
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Member-to-group inferences. Researchers are cognizant of a judgment bias 
now known as the “law of small numbers”. As early as the 1950s, Allport stated that 
“given a thimbleful of facts we rush to make generalizations as large as a tub” (1954: 8). 
The “law of small numbers” suggests that observers are likely to generalize from 
an individual’s behavior and inferred dispositions to other members of the individual’s 
group. Empirical support for this assertion was found in the social psychology literature 
(Henderson-King & Nisbett, 1996; Nisbett & Borgida, 1975; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). 
Inappropriate or biased inductive generalizations from a sample to a population occur 
even when the observer is trained in scientific inquiry (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971) and 
when it is clear to the observer that the sample is highly biased (Hamill, Wilson, & 
Nisbett, 1980). Generally, empirical studies have found that member-to-group inferences 
are more likely to occur when (1) the group is perceived to be homogeneous (Folkes & 
Patrick, 2003; Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983; Quattrone & Jones, 1980; 
Rothbart & Lewis, 1988; Wilder, 1984), and (2) the observer has vivid information 
about the member from which generalizations to the group are drawn (Hamill et al., 
1980).  
There are at least two possible explanations for the “law of small numbers.” 
Hamill et al. (1980) suggest that member-to-group inferences may be a result of 
unconscious, memory-mediated generalizations, where vivid information about a group 
member is first stored in the memory and then disproportionately available for use when 
judgments are later made about the group. Another reason why observers make member-
to-group inferences is the concept of homophily, the principle that a contact between 
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similar people occurs at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, & Cook, 2001). This reason is succinctly stated by the ancient adage “birds of a 
feather flock together” (Lazarsfeld & Merton, 1954). Social categorization theory 
suggests that individuals outside of a group are likely to perceive members in the group 
as homogenous (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991; Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; 
Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Furthermore, the perception of group homogeneity increases 
when one of the group members is perceived unfavorably (Doosje, Spears, & Koomen, 
1995). Indirect support for member-to-group inferences may also be found in the intra-
group behavior literature. Research has found that in-group members tend to devalue 
deviant members so as to reestablish the positivity and subjective uniformity of the in-
group as a whole (Marques & Paez, 1994). This finding, known as the black sheep 
effect, suggests that a deviant member of a group may pass on the appearance of 
deviance to those who share group membership. Furthermore, Eidelman and Biernat 
(2003) found that interpersonal similarity on one dimension (such as a common group 
membership) may imply similarity on other dimensions, including those dimensions 
perceived as unfavorable. 
The above-cited empirical studies support the assertion that investors’ perception 
of an ineffective interlocking director might spill over to the entire board of an 
associated firm regardless of the other board members’ actual dispositions. These 
spillover effects are symptomatic of biases in investors’ impression formation, and are 
consistent with recent findings that investors frequently make large errors that are 
influenced by psychological biases (Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam, 1998; 
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Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Teoh, 2002; Odean, 1998). These spillover effects are especially 
likely to occur because the interlocking director has been perceived unfavorably by 
investors (Doosje et al., 1995). Furthermore, research on corporate boards found that 
board members’ demographic similarities (a proxy for attitudinal and behavioral 
similarity) in a firm tend to increase over time (Westphal & Zajac, 1995). In other 
words, corporate board members become more homogenous over time. The more 
homogenous the corporate board, the more likely investors will make member-to-group 
inferences.  
Sent and received interlocks. While the above discourse applies to director 
interlocks in general, slight modifications are required to explain stigma by association 
through sent and received interlocks. Sent interlocks occur when a top executive of a 
stigmatized firm is an outside director of an associated firm. Attribution theory may be 
applied to sent interlocks. Because the director forming the sent interlock is a top 
executive of the stigmatized firm, investors will not attribute responsibility to this 
director for failing to monitor the executives of the stigmatized firm since that director is 
a member of the top executive team. However, investors are likely to blame the 
executive forming the sent interlock for the alleged accounting scandal because top 
executives have been charged and found responsible for these scandals (Forelle, 2004; 
Frank, 2004). The attribution of blame to top executives implies a perceived moral 
wrongdoing on the part of these executives (Fincham & Jaspars, 1980). When these 
executives have been blamed for orchestrating the alleged scandal, it is unlikely that 
investors will perceive them as effective monitors of top executives in an associated firm 
 
 30
where they are appointed as outside directors. These executives are not likely to protect 
the interests of investors in the associated firm when they have exhibited some level of 
untrustworthiness in the stigmatized firm. Investors’ perception that executives forming 
sent interlocks are ineffective monitors in an associated firm may then spill over to the 
entire board of the associated firm through biases in member-to-group inferences. 
Received interlocks represent situations when a top executive of an associated 
firm is an outside director of a stigmatized firm. According to attribution theory, 
investors are likely to attribute responsibility to the director forming the received 
interlock for potentially failing to monitor the executives of a stigmatized firm. 
However, the director forming a received interlock is a top executive in an associated 
firm and therefore, would not have any direct impact on the quality of board vigilance in 
the associated firm as perceived by investors. I argue that investors may still perceive an 
ineffective corporate board in an associated firm because corporate leaders have been 
found to exhibit generalized norms of reciprocity in social interactions (Westphal & 
Zajac, 1997).  
Norms of reciprocity are widely accepted social rules that require us to return 
favors to those who do something nice for us (Gouldner, 1960). Generalized norms of 
reciprocity, on the other hand, refer to a situation whereby a beneficiary reciprocates by 
taking action to benefit a social actor other than the benefactor (Dabos & Rousseau, 
2004; Ekeh, 1974). Such generalized norms of reciprocity have been found in corporate 
boards in the context of board independence (Westphal & Zajac, 1997). According to 
generalized norms of reciprocity, top executives who are directors in other firms tend to 
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behave in a manner that is consistent with their experiences in their own firm. 
Specifically, top executives who experience strong board vigilance in their firm will tend 
to exercise strong board vigilance when they are acting as outside directors in other 
firms. Likewise, top executives who experience weak board vigilance in their firm will 
tend to exercise weak board vigilance when they are acting as outside directors in other 
firms.  
Applying generalized norms of reciprocity to received interlocks, if a top 
executive of an associated firm is an ineffective director in a stigmatized firm, then one 
plausible reason for the ineffectiveness is that the corporate board in the associated firm 
is also ineffective in monitoring top executives. In other words, top executives of an 
associated firm sitting in the corporate board of a stigmatized firm are ineffective 
monitors because they themselves experience ineffective monitoring by the corporate 
board of their own firm. Hence, for received interlocks, the perception of social 
exchange reciprocity among corporate leaders in the associated and stigmatized firms 
may account for the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. 
Diffusion of organizational practices. So far, the application of social inference 
theories has focused on investor attributions that heighten the anticipation of board 
failures in associated firms linked to stigmatized firm through director interlocks. In this 
instance, the perceived deviation of norms by an associated firm is not restricted to 
deviation from accounting standards, but may include deviation from non-accounting 
norms as a result of ineffective board monitoring. There is at least one other explanation 
why investors may perceive a deviation of norms by an associated firm. This explanation 
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draws upon research in the diffusion of organizational practices through the interlocking 
directorate network.  
Some scholars suggest that director interlocks function as salient conduits of 
information about organizational practices (Davis, 1991; Useem, 1984). The diffusion of 
information through interlocking directorates is one plausible reason why interlocked 
firms adopt similar practices (Haunschild, 1993; Palmer et al., 1993; Westphal, Seidel, & 
Stewart, 2001). Despite broad research interests on director interlocks as conduits of 
information flow, research on interlocks and the adoption of accounting practices is in its 
nascent stage (Chua & Petty, 1999). The exchange of information between corporate 
leaders linked by director interlocks may be one channel where executives may come to 
know of creative and manipulative accounting practices used to distort reported 
profitability and indebtedness. It is clear that creative and manipulative accounting 
practices played a key role in the Enron debacle (Holt & Eccles, 2003). To the extent 
that investors perceive the diffusion of misleading accounting practices across director 
interlocks, these investors may anticipate a forthcoming SEC investigation on the 
accounting practices of an associated firm. In this instance, the perceived deviation of 
norms of an associated firm will be similar to that of the stigmatized firm – i.e., a 
deviation from accounting standards. 
Regardless of whether associated firms experience stigma because of investors’ 
perception of ineffective board monitoring in an associated firm or the perception that an 
associated firm has adopted misleading accounting practices, these perceptions are 
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driven by the presence of director interlocks between the associated and stigmatized 
firms. Hence, the above arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: Firms with director interlocks to other firms stigmatized by alleged accounting 
scandals will, on the average, experience stigma as a result of the association. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE AMOUNT OF STIGMA EXPERIENCED BY THE ASSOCIATED FIRM 
 
The previous chapter provides theoretical support for director interlocks as a 
plausible channel by which associated firms experience stigma. However, this does not 
imply that associated firms will always experience stigma or experience identical 
amounts of stigma through the network of director interlock(s). Hence, a question 
remains as to whether all firms associated with a stigmatized firm will be equally 
affected. Borrowing from extant studies of contagion effects, there are two alternative 
processes in which associated firms experience stigma, a pure non-discriminatory 
process or an information-based process (Brewer, Genay, Hunter, & Kaufman, 2003; 
Jordan, Peek, & Rosengren, 2000). In the non-discriminatory process (or the pure 
contagion hypothesis), all associated firms will be equally stigmatized without 
discrimination. However, in the information-based process, associated firms will be 
stigmatized to different extents, depending on the availability of information that sheds 
light on firm characteristics and other factors relevant to the stigmatizing event. I argue 
that the stigmatization of associated firms is likely to be information-based, taking into 
account firm-level and individual-level characteristics that discriminate between 
associated firms embedded in the interlocking directorate network. In other words, firms 
associated with stigmatized firms will experience different degrees of stigmatization, or 
may experience no stigma at all. Henceforth, the term “stigma” will refer to the stigma 
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experienced by a firm associated with a stigmatized firm through director interlocks, 
unless stated otherwise. 
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model of how the amount of stigma is 
influenced by various individual and firm-level variables. I group these variables into 
four categories: the characteristics of the interlocking director, the characteristics of the 
board in an associated firm, the strength of the director interlock, and the quality of 
corporate governance in an associated firm. These four categories of variables span 
multiple levels of analysis, from the individual director, to the corporate board, to 
corporate governance at the level of a firm. 
Characteristics of the Interlocking Director 
The amount of stigma may be influenced by the characteristics of an interlocking 
director. Specifically, I examine the prominence of an interlocking director in the 
associated and stigmatized firms. Prominence refers to the position of a director in the 
corporate boards of the stigmatized or associated firms. Prominence matters in a 
stigmatized firm because it affects the level of responsibility or blame attributed to an 
interlocking director for the alleged accounting scandal. Prominence also matters in an 
associated firm because it affects inferences about the effectiveness of the corporate 
board in detecting corporate scandals or other deviation from norms. 
Director prominence in a stigmatized firm. The amount of stigma experienced 
by an associated firm is partly influenced by the level of responsibility or blame 
attributed to the interlocking director. If an interlocking director is not attributed any 
responsibility or blame for the alleged accounting scandal, the amount of stigma is likely 
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to be low or nonexistent because his or her directorship in an associated firm is of 
minimal or no consequence from an investor's perspective. However, the greater the 
attribution of responsibility or blame to the interlocking director in a stigmatized firm, 
the more likely investors will take into account the potential negative consequences of 
the directorship position in an associated firm. Hence, I expect the amount of stigma to 
be influenced by the level of responsibility or blame attributed to the interlocking 
director in a stigmatized firm.  
Investors are more likely to attribute responsibility or blame to an interlocking 
director for the alleged accounting scandal if the director holds a prominent position in a 
stigmatized firm. Investors may assess a director's prominence by focusing on the formal 
title that the director holds in corporate board committees. Board committees have 
generated research interests due to their increasing importance in effectively discharging 
board functions (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998; Kesner, 1988). Although 
corporate boards are made up of various committees with different functional roles, the 
chair of an audit committee is likely to feature most prominently when investors are 
attributing blame for alleged accounting scandals. This is because the audit committee 
chair is overall responsible for the performance of the audit committee, whose charter is 
to provide independent and objective oversight of a firm’s accounting functions and 
internal controls so as to assure the objectivity of the firm’s financial statements. Alleged 
accounting scandals unequivocally point to the possible failure of the audit committee to 
verify the objectivity of a stigmatized firm's financial statements. Hence, investors may 
hold the audit committee chair to a higher level of accountability and attribute more 
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responsibility to the audit committee chair for an alleged accounting scandal when 
compared with a board member without such a title. These arguments may be 
summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: An interlocking director holding the position of audit committee chair in a 
stigmatized firm is positively correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the 
associated firm. 
 
Director prominence in an associated firm. The prominence of an interlocking 
director in an associated firm is also important for the amount of stigma experienced by 
the associated firm. As explained earlier, associated firms are stigmatized through an 
inferential process. Specifically, investors perceive that an associated firm may also have 
deviated from some norms because the corporate board in the associated firm may be 
perceived as ineffective monitors of top executives. One reason why investors make 
such inferences is because the interlocking director is first perceived as an ineffective 
monitor of top executives, and this initial perception may generalize to the entire board 
in an associated firm through biases in the social inference process. The willingness of 
investors to make such generalizations is likely to increase if the interlocking director 
occupies a prominent position in the corporate board of an associated firm. As I have 
previously highlighted, the audit committee chair holds a prominent position because the 
chair is overall responsible for the audit committee’s task of verifying the objectivity of 
a firm’s financial statements. Hence, if an interlocking director is the audit committee 
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chair in an associated firm, investors are more likely to infer that misleading accounting 
practices used to prepare the financial statements of the firm have been overlooked when 
compared with an interlocking director who is not the audit committee chair. These 
arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H3: An interlocking director holding the position of audit committee chair in an 
associated firm is positively correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the 
firm. 
 
In addition to the audit committee chair, the chair of the corporate governance 
committee is likely to feature prominently in investors’ perception. Generally, corporate 
governance committees are responsible for developing and recommending to the board a 
set of corporate governance principles. Since this committee is expected to take a 
leadership role in improving the effectiveness of corporate governance in a firm, the 
chair of this committee is likely to shape investors’ perception on the overall 
effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms that protect investors’ interests. 
Investors’ perception on the overall effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms is 
important for the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. As I have 
previously argued, the perceived deviation from norms by an associated firm is not 
restricted to deviations from accounting standards but includes deviation from non-
accounting norms as a result of weak board vigilance. Therefore, if an interlocking 
director is the corporate governance committee chair in an associated firm, investors are 
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more likely to infer that deviations from non-accounting norms may have been 
overlooked due to the perceived ineffective internal governance mechanisms when 
compared with an interlocking director who is not the chair of the corporate governance 
committee. These arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H4: An interlocking director holding the position of corporate governance committee 
chair in an associated firm is positively correlated with the amount of stigma 
experienced by the firm. 
 
Characteristics of the Board in an Associated Firm 
The amount of stigma may be influenced by the characteristics of the board in an 
associated firm. Specifically, I focus on how board members’ homogeneity to the 
interlocking director influences the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. 
Board members’ homogeneity in an associated firm is important because it affects 
investors’ inferences about the effectiveness of the corporate board in curbing possible 
corporate scandals. As previously argued, investors are more likely to make member-to-
group inferences when the corporate board is perceived to be more homogenous (Folkes 
& Patrick, 2003; Nisbett et al., 1983; Quattrone & Jones, 1980). Specifically, if other 
directors in an associated firm are similar to the interlocking director, and if the 
interlocking director has been perceived as an ineffective monitor of top executives, then 
other directors in the same board may also be perceived to be ineffective monitors of top 
executives too. The idea that interpersonal similarity on one dimension (such as a 
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common board membership) may imply similarity on other dimensions (Eidelman & 
Biernat, 2003) is consistent with the concept of homophily, which states that contact 
between similar people occur at a higher rate than among dissimilar people (McPherson 
et al., 2001). 
Attitudinal and behavioral similarities of directors are most relevant when 
investors form their perceptions on the effectiveness of board monitoring. However, 
investors are more likely to use demographic attributes in the impression formation 
process since these attributes are easily accessible. Furthermore, member-to-group 
inferences are symptomatic of biases in investors’ impression formation. Hence, when 
the perception of an ineffective interlocking director spills over to the entire board of an 
associated firm, the spillover effect is not likely to result from a detailed analysis of 
attitudinal and behavioral similarities of directors, but the analysis of easily accessible 
demographics that represent attitudes and behavior. The use of demographic attributes as 
proxies for attitudinal and behavioral characteristics have been discussed in Hambrick 
and Mason’s (1984) seminal work on the “upper echelons” perspective. Thereafter, 
scholars have adopted various demographic attributes of upper echelons (such as gender, 
age, firm or group tenure, functional or educational background) in studies of firm 
performance and behavior, executive turnover, innovation, and director selection (Bantel 
& Jackson, 1989; Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996; Murray, 1989; Wagner, Pfeffer, & 
O'Reilly, 1984; Westphal & Zajac, 1995). To the extent that investors also use easily 
accessible demographic attributes of directors to assess the homogeneity of corporate 
boards, the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm is likely to be stronger 
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the more demographically homogenous the corporate board in the associated firm. These 
arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis:  
 
H5: Demographic homogeneity of a corporate board in an associated firm is positively 
correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. 
 
Strength of the Director Interlock 
The amount of stigma may be influenced by the strength of association between 
firms. Neuberg et al. (1994) found that an individual may be stigmatized simply because 
of his or her association with a stigmatized individual, and not because the former is 
perceived to have deviated from any norms. Similarly, firms may be stigmatized simply 
because of their association with other stigmatized firms, and not because of any 
perceived deviation of norms. In this case, the amount of stigma experienced by 
associated firms may reflect the disapproval of investors toward the associated firms for 
maintaining relationships with stigmatized firms or the negative affect of investors 
toward stigmatized firms spilling over to associated firms.  
To the extent that firms are stigmatized simply because of their associations with 
stigmatized firms, then an associated firm with strong ties to a stigmatized firm may 
experience more stigma when compared with an associated firm with weak ties to a 
stigmatized firm. In the context of interlocking directorates, investors may assess the 
strength of interlock ties by referring to the number of interlock types and the duration of 
director interlocks between the stigmatized and associated firms. 
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Number of interlock types. An associated firm may be linked to a stigmatized 
firm in one of the following three ways: a single interlock (whether a neutral, sent, or 
received interlock type), a dual interlock (any two out of the three interlock types), or a 
triple interlock (all three interlock types). The number of interlock types is likely to 
influence the amount of stigma for at least two reasons. First, investors are likely to 
perceive stronger social relations between corporate leaders in two firms with a greater 
number of interlock types. Furthermore, the greater the number of interlock types, the 
greater is the expected frequency of social exchange between corporate leaders in the 
interlocked firms. Stronger social relations and greater frequency of social exchange are 
likely to facilitate the diffusion of information between corporate leaders. As a result, 
investors may perceive an increase in the likelihood that firms connected through these 
interlocks may have adopted misleading accounting practices. Second, investors are 
more likely to perceive that the corporate board of an associated firm is ineffective in 
monitoring top executives if the number of interlock types between a stigmatized and an 
associated firm is higher. For instance, the presence of a triple interlock between an 
associated firm and a stigmatized firm indicates that a larger number of interlocking 
directors in the associated firm are ineffective monitors of top executives when 
compared with a single or dual interlock. Hence, using social inference theories, an 
investor’s member-to-group inference regarding the effectiveness of the corporate board 
in an associated firm is reinforced by the presence of multiple interlock types. 
Specifically, the above arguments suggest that an associated firm with a triple interlock 
to a stigmatized firm may experience the most stigma because investors are more likely 
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to perceive the adoption of misleading accounting practices or the presence of weak 
board vigilance. These arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: Associated firms with triple interlocks to stigmatized firms experience more stigma 
when compared with associated firms with single or dual interlocks to stigmatized firms. 
 
Duration of director interlocks. The duration of director interlocks is likely to 
influence an investor’s perception of the strength of these interlocks. For instance, if a 
stigmatized firm and an associated firm are connected for only one month through a 
director interlock, then the amount of stigma is likely to be lower when compared with a 
stigmatized firm and an associated firm that have been connected for five years. The 
duration of director interlocks matters to an investor’s perception for at least two 
reasons. First, the longer the duration of an interlock between two firms, the more likely 
that information on accounting practices from one firm will diffuse to the other firm, and 
vice versa. As a result, investors may perceive a higher likelihood that firms connected 
through interlocks with longer durations may have adopted misleading accounting 
practices. Second, interlocks that last for a longer time expose the interlocking directors 
to longer periods of socialization in the associated firms. Socialization processes have 
the effect of producing homogeneity in individual personalities (Chatman, 1991). 
Furthermore, Schneider, Smith, Taylor, and Fleenor (1998) found that organizations are 
relatively homogenous with respect to the personality attributes of their managers, and 
one of the reasons behind this homogeneity effect is the socialization process. Hence, a 
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longer period of director interlock exposes the interlocking director to longer periods of 
socialization, and longer periods of socialization lead to greater homogeneity of 
corporate board members’ personality in an associated firm. Homogeneity of corporate 
boards is an important consideration since member-to-group inferences are more likely 
to be made when groups are homogenous (Folkes & Patrick, 2003; Rothbart & Lewis, 
1988). Therefore, the entire corporate board in an associated firm may be perceived as 
ineffective monitors of top executives due to biases in member-to-group inferences. 
These arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H7: The duration of director interlocks between a stigmatized firm and an associated 
firm is positively correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the associated 
firm. 
 
Quality of Corporate Governance in an Associated Firm 
Social inference theories have been applied to explain how investors may 
attribute responsibility or blame to an interlocking director, and how the perception of an 
interlocking director as an ineffective monitor of top executives may generalize to the 
entire board in an associated firm. Generalizing from one director to an entire board is a 
result of cognitive biases in the impression formation process. However, in efficient 
markets, investors are likely to scrutinize the governance mechanisms of an associated 
firm, and then make an informed judgment on how effective these mechanisms are in 
monitoring top executives. To the extent that investors perceive the presence of effective 
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governance mechanisms in an associated firm, these governance mechanisms will act as 
barriers to the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. This is because the 
effective functioning of alternative governance mechanisms in an associated firm 
mitigates the potential negative consequences of an ineffective interlocking director. 
Agency theorists have examined a variety of governance mechanisms that protect 
investors if top executives have interests that diverge from those of investors. These 
governance mechanisms may be categorized according to their purported functions. 
Monitoring mechanisms, such as the board structure and outside ownership structure, 
seek to oversee or police managerial behaviors. Alignment mechanisms, such as the 
ownership holdings of CEOs and inside directors, seek to harmonize top executive 
behaviors with investors' interests. These monitoring and alignment governance 
mechanisms are the building blocks that an investor may use to assess the quality of 
corporate governance in an associated firm. I shall discuss each of these mechanisms 
below. 
Board size. According to agency theorists, large boards tend to exercise weaker 
governance for at least three reasons. First, according to Jensen (1993), corporate boards 
beyond the size of seven or eight directors are less likely to function effectively and are 
easier for the CEO to control. One explanation is that large boards may be more 
contentious and fragmented when compared with small boards because of a decrease in 
group cohesiveness (Evans & Dion, 1991). As a result, CEOs may selectively channel 
information among board members or adopt coalition building tactics to gain an 
advantage in power relations vis-à-vis board members (Alexander, Fennell, & Halpern, 
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1993). Hence, board members’ assessments of top executives may be easily manipulated 
when boards are large and diverse (Mintzberg, 1983). Second, individual directors may 
exert less effort to monitor top executives when board size increases because social 
loafing is more likely to occur in larger groups (Sheppard, 1993). This free-rider 
problem occurs because the benefits of increased vigilance exerted by one director 
accrue to the entire board while its cost is solely borne by the director exerting the effort. 
As a result, large boards may become less effective as individual directors shirk 
responsibility and increase their reliance on other directors to monitor the top executives. 
Finally, other researchers argue that large boards may be less focused, less participative, 
and less able to arrive at a consensus in decision-making when compared with small 
boards (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). Investors 
will have less assurance that the potential negative consequences of an ineffective 
interlocking director have been mitigated to the extent that a large board in an associated 
firm indicates ineffective governance. As a result, the amount of stigma experienced by 
an associated firm is expected to be stronger when the associated firm has a larger 
number of directors in its corporate board. These arguments may be summarized in the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H8: Board size in an associated firm is positively correlated with the amount of stigma 
experienced by the firm. 
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Independent board chair. The appropriate leadership structure of a firm’s 
corporate board has generated much debate among scholars, managers, activist 
shareholders, board reformers, and other policy-making groups (Brickley, Coles, & 
Jarrell, 1997; Dalton et al., 1998). When the CEO is also the board chair, board vigilance 
is weakened (Mace, 1971; Mizruchi, 1983) because there is less independence between 
the board and top executives to prevent CEO entrenchment (Mallette & Fowler, 1992). 
Although Dalton et al. (1998) concluded that there is no evidence of a substantive 
negative relationship between board leadership structure and firm performance, there is 
anecdotal evidence that the public’s normative expectations are consistent with the 
assertions of agency theorists (McKinnon, 2004; Orwall, Steinberg, & Lublin, 2004). 
For instance, investor activism has pressured the board of Walt Disney to separate the 
roles of the CEO and board chair (Orwall et al., 2004). While the preference is for 
different individuals to occupy the CEO and board chair positions, Coles and Hesterly 
(2000) found that it is more important that the board chair be an independent director. 
This is because a board chair that is a former CEO of a firm will not be as independent 
as a non-affiliated chairman. If an independent board chair is able to reinforce the 
desired system of checks and balances that decreases opportunism by top executives, 
then investors will have more assurance that the potential negative consequences of an 
ineffective interlocking director have been mitigated. As a result, the amount of stigma 
experienced by an associated firm is expected to be weaker when the board chair is an 
independent director. These arguments may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
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H9: The presence of an independent board chair in an associated firm is negatively 
correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. 
 
Proportion of independent directors. Outside directors have been viewed as an 
important counterweight to the diverging interests between investors and top executives 
(Fama, 1980; Mizruchi, 1983). However, not all outside directors in a firm are 
independent of top executives because some directors, referred to as affiliated directors, 
may have existing personal and/or professional relationships with the firm or its top 
executives (Daily, Johnson, & Dalton, 1999). To the extent that outside directors are 
independent and do not experience conflicts of interest, they would be better suited to act 
in ways that enhance shareholder interests (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Mizruchi & 
Stearns, 1988; Rechner, Sundaramurthy, & Dalton, 1993). Unlike independent directors, 
inside and affiliated directors are expected to be more subservient to the interests of the 
CEO and more likely to endorse the CEO’s decision as well as entrench the CEO’s 
power. The presence of a greater number of inside directors has been associated with 
retaining the CEO during periods of poor performance (Weisbach, 1988) and payments 
of greenmail (Kosnik, 1987). Although Dalton et al. (1998) did not find support for the 
assertion that a higher proportion of independent directors will significantly reduce 
agency costs and hence improve firm performance, there is evidence that the public's 
normative expectations are consistent with the assertions of agency theorists. For 
instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requires all board audit committee directors to 
be independent and major stock exchanges in the United States require a majority of 
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independent directors in listed firms. Investors will have greater assurance that the 
potential negative consequences of an ineffective interlocking director have been 
mitigated if the quality of corporate governance in an associated firm is improved by 
appointing a higher proportion of independent directors. As a result, the amount of 
stigma experienced by an associated firm is expected to be weaker when the associated 
firm has a higher proportion of independent directors. These arguments may be 
summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H10: The proportion of independent directors in an associated firm is negatively 
correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. 
 
Ownership of independent directors. In order for corporate boards to be 
effective monitors of top executives, directors must not only be independent of the top 
executives, but also be willing to discharge their monitoring role (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003). Independent directors holding an equity stake in a firm are expected to be more 
willing to promote investors’ interests and not allow the CEO to make decisions that 
reduce investors’ wealth. This is because the personal wealth of a director who holds an 
equity stake in a firm is now linked to investors' wealth. There is empirical support for 
these assertions. For instance, board vigilance over the CEO is found to be weakened 
when independent directors have little financial stake in the firm or when they have 
small stockholdings (Kosnik, 1990). Furthermore, board reformers often advocate that 
directors hold equity stakes and that their compensation be partially in the form of equity 
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(Jensen, 1993). To the extent that independent directors holding higher equity stakes in 
an associated firm is indicative of better quality governance, investors will have greater 
assurance that the potential negative consequences of an ineffective interlocking director 
have been mitigated. As a result, the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm 
is expected to be weaker when independent directors in the associated firm have a higher 
proportion of equity ownership. These arguments may be summarized in the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H11: The ownership of independent directors in an associated firm is negatively 
correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. 
 
Institutional ownership. Monitoring mechanisms are not limited to corporate 
boards. Large investors have the incentive to collect information and monitor top 
executives to promote a firm’s long-term performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In 
particular, Chung, Firth, and Kim (2002) found that large institutional investors inhibit 
managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits through the use of discretionary 
accounting accruals. Institutional investors can monitor top executives at a lower cost 
than can small atomistic investors, because they have greater expertise and can better 
coordinate their efforts to exert control over top executives (Pound, 1988; Wade, 
O'Reilly III, & Chandratat, 1990). Furthermore, ownership concentration of institutional 
investors leads to greater monitoring by reducing the disincentive created by a free-rider 
problem when investors monitor the top executives – i.e., the cost of monitoring top 
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executives are solely borne by the investors doing the monitoring while the benefits 
accrue to all investors (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). However, not 
all institutional investors are alike. For instance, several researchers have discriminated 
between pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional investors (Brickley, Lease, 
& Smith, 1988; Kochhar & David, 1996). Pressure-sensitive institutional investors, such 
as banks and insurance companies, have existing or potential business relationships with 
firms and are viewed as less effective monitors of top executives. Pressure-resistant 
institutional investors, such as pension funds and professional investment funds, do not 
seek business relationships with the firms in which they invest and are more likely to 
closely monitor and impose controls on top executives. Prior empirical studies suggest 
that pressure-resistant institutional investors exhibit high levels of activism to influence 
the outcome of corporate decisions (Brickley et al., 1988; David, Kochhar, & Levitas, 
1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002; Kochhar & David, 1996; Tihanyi, 
Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). To the extent that the presence of pressure-resistant 
institutional investors is indicative of more effective governance, the potential negative 
consequences of an ineffective interlocking director have been mitigated. As a result, the 
amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm is expected to be weaker when there 
is a higher concentration of pressure-resistant institutional investors in the associated 
firm. The above argument may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H12: The ownership of pressure-resistant institutional investors in an associated firm is 
negatively correlated with the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. 
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Ownership of inside directors. Thus far, I have discussed the mitigating effects 
of monitoring mechanisms on the potential negative consequences of an ineffective 
interlocking director. Other than monitoring mechanisms, governance mechanisms that 
align the interests of CEOs and inside directors with those of investors are also 
important. The adoption of contingent, long-term incentive contracts for top executives 
is one such mechanism (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). One form of incentive contract is to 
compensate top executives with equity ownership. Top executives with contingent 
compensation tied to investors’ wealth through equity-based pay are more likely to align 
their interests with those of investors. Researchers have pointed out the potential conflict 
of interest between top executives and investors when top executives do not have an 
ownership interest in the firm (Berle & Means, 1932). Furthermore, agency theory 
suggests that due to the separation of ownership and control, the degree to which top 
executives use their abilities to maximize investors’ wealth is dependent on the 
percentage of equity ownership these executives have in the firm (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Walkling & Long, 1984). There is also empirical evidence 
that an increase in the equity holdings of top executives results in a decrease in the 
likelihood of adopting decisions that sub-optimize investor wealth (Dalton & Rechner, 
1989; Oswald & Jahera, 1991). For instance, Hoskisson et al. (2002) found that inside 
directors with higher ownership stakes behave more like owners by promoting long-term 
firm performance through an emphasis on internal innovations. To the extent that a 
higher proportion of top executives’ equity ownership indicates effective corporate 
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governance, the potential negative consequences of an ineffective interlocking director 
have been mitigated. This is because less monitoring of top executives is required when 
these top executives’ have aligned their interests with those of investors. As a result, the 
amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm is expected to be weaker when top 
executives’ share of equity ownership is higher in the associated firm. The above 
argument may be summarized in the following hypothesis: 
 
H13: The ownership of inside directors in an associated firm is negatively correlated 
with the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. 
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CHAPTER V 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology for testing the empirical model 
shown in Figure 1. I shall first discuss the sampling methodology of the study. Next, I 
highlight how stigma from alleged accounting scandals and stigma experienced by 
associated firms are measured. Thereafter, I explain how the four categories of 
independent variables are measured. Finally, I highlight the control variables that are 
included in the statistical analysis. 
Sampling Methodology 
The unit of analysis is the firm. There are two groups of firms for which data 
have to be collected. The first group is a list of publicly traded firms alleged to have 
adopted misleading accounting practices, and the second group is a list of publicly 
traded firms associated with the firms in the first list through director interlocks. I 
searched the Lexis-Nexis database for announcements of firms that were investigated by 
the SEC from 1998 to 2002 to generate the first list of firms alleged to have adopted 
misleading accounting practices. The SEC is an enforcement agency whose primary 
mission is to protect investors and maintain the integrity of the securities market. Public 
announcements that the SEC is investigating a firm’s accounting practices are likely to 
trigger public interest and generate a response by investors.  
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FIGURE 1 
Empirical Model 
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I chose a five-year period from 1998 through 2002 so that the more current 
alleged accounting scandals after the Enron debacle may be included with those alleged 
accounting scandals that occurred in the late 1990s. During the sample period, there are 
143 reported incidences of publicly traded firms investigated by the SEC for potential 
accounting irregularities, such as disclosure violations as well as revenue, expense, 
and/or earnings manipulation. It is important to note that this population of firms 
investigated by the SEC may or may not subsequently be found guilty of adopting 
misleading accounting practices. 
A random sample of 30 publicly traded firms was drawn from the population of 
143 firms. The main criterion for including a firm into the sample of 30 is that each of 
these firms must have experienced stigma from the alleged accounting scandal. This is 
because the concept of stigma by association requires a firm accused of adopting 
misleading accounting practices to first experience stigma followed by the stigmatization 
of associated firms. The other criterion is that these 30 firms must have data in the CRSP 
database. After finalizing the sample of 30 firms, I searched the proxy statements of 
these firms to generate a second list of publicly traded firms that are associated with 
these firms through director interlocks. Specifically, an interlocking director must be on 
the board of the stigmatized and associated firms on the day that the firm accused of 
adopting misleading accounting practices is stigmatized. In total, there were 251 
associated firms in the second list. Of the 251 associated firms, seven firms were 
subjected to prior investigations by the SEC for misleading accounting practices during 
the period of study. These seven firms were dropped from the sample because any 
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stigma experienced by these firms may be the direct consequence of an SEC 
investigation as opposed to stigmatization resulting from an association with firms 
accused of an accounting scandal. The remaining sample of 244 associated firms was 
used to test the hypotheses in this dissertation. 
The Measurement of Stigma 
The measurement of stigma at the firm level is important not only for hypotheses 
testing, but also for generating the random sample of 30 stigmatized firms. I used the 
negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from financial-event study analysis as a 
proxy for stigma from alleged accounting scandals and the amount of stigma 
experienced by associated firms. 
Past studies have used financial-event techniques to examine the reputational 
penalties of corporate crime (Alexander, 1999; Karpoff & Lott, 1993). A financial-event 
technique is an appropriate methodology to measure stigma from alleged accounting 
scandals for at least two reasons. First, stigma is conferred by various stakeholders, and 
hence may vary by stakeholders. I have focused this dissertation on one key stakeholder, 
the investor. Since financial-event studies examine investors’ reaction to public 
announcements, this methodology is appropriate for the measurement of stigma from 
alleged accounting scandals. Second, alleged accounting scandals are unexpected and 
generate a lot of public interest when they occur. Because these alleged scandals have 
been extensively reported in the public presses, it is possible to identify the dates in 
which news of these alleged scandals are initially released to the public and the 
subsequent reports as the details of the allegations unfold.  
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The use of a financial-event study requires the identification of specific dates on 
which allegations of accounting scandals were made. I searched the Lexis-Nexis 
database for the first news article that alleges an accounting scandal for each of the 30 
firms. Thereafter, I searched for other news articles that discuss the alleged accounting 
scandal for each of the 30 firms up to 3 months from the date of the first article. 
Extending the search to all relevant news articles for a period of 3 months takes into 
account that allegations of accounting scandal may evolve over time. Specifically, the 
first article that alleges an accounting scandal may be based on hearsay that merely 
indicates suspicion that the SEC has initiated an inquiry into the accounting practices of 
a firm. Hence, articles that report the possibility of a SEC investigation may precede the 
actual SEC's announcement that it has commenced an inquiry into a firm's accounting 
practices. Furthermore, the SEC enforcement process may begin with an informal 
inquiry that may or may not subsequently progress to a formal inquiry. Investors' 
reaction to these different types of SEC inquiries is likely to differ. Finally, earlier 
reports on alleged accounting scandals are often sketchy, with little details on how 
executives may have manipulated the accounting records. With the passage of time, 
these sketchy accounts are replaced by more detailed reports on how accounting records 
have been manipulated, the estimated amounts misstated, and the identity of the 
potential perpetrators. Investors are expected to react to this additional information that 
unfolds over time. All the above reasons point to allegations of accounting scandals as a 
process of social construction that occurs over time as opposed to simply relying on the 
initial article that alleges the scandal or the initial article that announces the SEC's 
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investigation. Hence, there is a need to search for other relevant articles to more 
adequately capture investors' stigmatization of the firm over time. The above steps 
generated a list of 30 firms, each firm with a set of specific dates on which reports of 
alleged accounting scandals had been published in news articles. The next step is to 
conduct a financial-event study analysis. 
Central to a financial-event study is the measurement of an abnormal stock return 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The abnormal return (AR) is the actual ex post return on the share 
price of a firm minus the normal return on day t: 
ARit = Rit - E(Rit) 
where ARit = abnormal return on the share price for firm i on event date t 
 Rit = actual ex post return on the share price for firm i on event date t 
 E(Rit) = normal return on the share price for firm i on event date t 
 
The normal return, E(Rit), is defined as the expected return if the event had not 
taken place. The computation of the normal return requires an estimation window that is 
typically prior to and does not overlap with the event window (MacKinlay, 1997). I set 
the estimation window at 300 to 100 trading days prior to the event window. The normal 
return is computed using a market model of the normal share price behavior. The market 
model is a statistical model that relates the return of any given share to the return of a 
specified market portfolio: 
E(Rit) = αi + βiRmt + εit
where αi = the intercept term 
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 βi = the systematic risk of firm i 
 Rmt = the rate of return on a market portfolio of shares on event date t 
 εit = the error term, with E(εit) = 0 and var(εit) = σε2
 
Since the 30 firms alleged to have adopted misleading accounting practices are of 
varying sizes and may or may not be S&P500 firms, I used the value-weighted CRSP 
index (instead of the S&P500 index) as the market portfolio to derive αi and βi of the 
market model. The abnormal stock return (ARit) is computed after determining the 
normal return, E(Rit), from the market model. The abnormal stock returns for each day in 
the event window is then summed up to arrive at the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
over the event window: 
                                                                               t2 
                                                          CARi(t1, t2) = ΣARit 
                                                                                                                     t=t1
 
where CARi(t1, t2) is the cumulative abnormal return for firm i over the specified 
event window, day -1 to day 0. A short two-day event window of (-1, 0) is used because 
a financial-event study assumes that markets are efficient and that “any financially 
relevant information that is newly released to investors will be quickly (instantaneously) 
incorporated into stock prices” (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997: 630). The cumulative 
abnormal return for each firm over the two-day event window measures the extent to 
which a firm has been stigmatized. A positive (or negative but not statistically 
significant) cumulative abnormal return suggests that a firm did not experience stigma as 
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a result of the alleged accounting scandal, while a statistically significant negative 
cumulative abnormal return suggests otherwise. 
The financial-event study as described above was conducted for each of the 30 
firms, for each of the dates on which reports on alleged accounting scandals were 
published. Hence, each date for each firm is the event date for the analysis. A cumulative 
abnormal return was computed for each event date for each firm and the significance as 
well as the sign of the cumulative abnormal return is noted. To ensure that the 
cumulative abnormal return measures investors' reactions to alleged accounting scandals 
on an event date, confounding announcements one day before, on, and one day after the 
event date resulted in the removal of that date from further analysis (McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997). 
An event date was removed from further analysis if the cumulative abnormal 
return for the date was positive (or negative but not statistically significant). This is 
because a positive (or negative but not statistically significant) cumulative abnormal 
return on an event date suggests that a firm accused of an accounting scandal did not 
experience any stigma on that date. Since this dissertation examines the phenomenon of 
stigma by association, a firm accused of an accounting scandal must first experience 
stigma before other firms are stigmatized by association. Hence these dates were 
removed to prevent biases that may obscure that evidence of stigma by association 
between firms when the phenomenon indeed exists in networks of director interlocks. If 
the cumulative abnormal return for an event date was negative and statistically 
significant, that date was retained for further analysis. If none of the event dates for a 
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firm had a statistically significant negative cumulative abnormal return, then the firm 
was dropped and replaced by another firm randomly drawn from the remaining 
population and the financial-event study repeated.  
The end result of the above analysis is a list of 30 stigmatized firms, each firm 
with at least one event date for which a statistically significant negative cumulative 
abnormal return was observed as a result of an alleged accounting scandal. The event 
date(s) for each of the 30 stigmatized firms provides the evidence that the firm has been 
stigmatized on the date(s) as a result of the alleged accounting scandal, and other firms 
may then experience stigma because of an association through the network of director 
interlock(s). 
Financial-event studies have also been used to examine contagion effects 
between firms (Brewer et al., 2003; Jordan et al., 2000; Slovin, Sushka, & Polonchek, 
1999). Hence, financial-event studies may also be used to examine the amount of stigma 
experienced by associated firms. The 30 stigmatized firms are linked to 244 associated 
firms through director interlocks. Each of these 30 stigmatized firms has a set of event 
date(s) over the 3-month period on which these firms have been stigmatized as a result 
of the alleged accounting scandal. To determine whether an associated firm is also 
stigmatized, a financial-event study was conducted on the associated firm using the 
event date(s) of the stigmatized firm connected to the firm through a director interlock. 
The presence of confounding announcements about an associated firm one day before, 
on, and one day after the event date(s) resulted in the removal of that date from further 
analysis for the same reasons as above. The overall cumulative abnormal return for each 
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associated firm over the two-day event window measures the extent to which the firm 
has been stigmatized. Hence, there will be one cumulative abnormal return computed for 
each associated firm that captures the market reaction for the associated firm across all 
event date(s) over the 3-month period. A positive (or negative but insignificant) 
cumulative abnormal return suggests that a firm did not experience stigma as a result of 
the association, while a significant negative cumulative abnormal return suggests 
otherwise. A negative and statistically significant average cumulative abnormal return 
for the 244 associated firms provides support for hypothesis 1. 
Independent Variables 
The magnitude of the cumulative abnormal returns for each associated firm also 
measures the amount of stigma experienced by the firm. Hypotheses 2 to 13 highlight 
four categories of variables that may influence the amount of stigma experienced by the 
associated firms. These hypotheses are tested in this study using fourteen independent 
variables. I discuss the data source of these independent variables and how each variable 
is measured in the order of the hypothesis number.  
Hypothesis 2: Director prominence. Whether an interlocking director holds the 
position of audit committee chair in a stigmatized firm was measured using a 
dichotomous variable as follows: 
A value of 1 indicates that the interlocking director is the audit committee chair 
in the stigmatized firm, and 
A value of 0 indicates otherwise. 
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The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statement of the 
stigmatized firm. 
Hypothesis 3: Director prominence. Whether an interlocking director holds the 
position of audit committee chair in an associated firm was measured using a 
dichotomous variable as follows: 
A value of 1 indicates that the interlocking director is the audit committee chair 
in the associated firm, and 
A value of 0 indicates otherwise. 
The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statement of the 
associated firm. 
Hypothesis 4: Director prominence. Whether an interlocking director holds the 
position of corporate governance committee chair in an associated firm was measured 
using a dichotomous variable as follows: 
A value of 1 indicates that the interlocking director is the corporate governance 
committee chair in the associated firm, and 
A value of 0 indicates otherwise. 
The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statement of the 
associated firm. 
Hypothesis 5: Board homogeneity. Demographic homogeneity of an 
interlocking director with other board members in an associated firm was measured 
using three demographic attributes, namely, age, board tenure, and occupation 
background. Director's age and board tenure in an associated firm are continuous 
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variables. Occupation background is a dichotomous variable, coded as one if a director 
in an associated firm is concurrently an employed executive of a publicly listed firm, and 
zero otherwise. 
Based on these three demographic attributes, three measures of demographic 
homogeneity were created for each associated firm. Since the unit of analysis is the 
associated firm, the demographic homogeneity of an interlocking director with each 
board member in an associated firm was aggregated across all board members to arrive 
at a measure for each firm. Two different formulas were used to compute the three 
measures of demographic homogeneity. For both age and board tenure, each interlocking 
director’s demographic homogeneity with other board members was computed using a 
Euclidean distance measure adopted by prior researchers (O'Reilly, Caldwell, & Barnett, 
1989; Westphal & Zajac, 1995): 
        N   ½
(Si – Sj)2  Σ
j=1 N 
  
 
where Si is the age or board tenure for interlocking director i, and Sj represents 
the age or board tenure of the jth board member in an associated firm, and N represents 
the board size of the associated firm less the interlocking director.  
The above formula measures the square root of the mean squared distance in age 
or board tenure of interlocking director i from all other board members in an associated 
firm. The squaring and square root operations make this measure less sensitive to the 
direction of an interlocking director’s distance from the other board members, without 
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giving disproportionate weight to greater distances (O'Reilly et al., 1989). The larger the 
value, the greater the demographic difference between the interlocking director and other 
board members in an associated firm. I converted this measure into an indicator of 
demographic homogeneity by using the reciprocal of the computed value, where larger 
values now indicate greater demographic homogeneity in age or board tenure between 
the interlocking director and other board members in an associated firm. 
For occupation background, I applied a variant of Blau’s (1977) heterogeneity 
index, defined as (Pi)2, where Pi is the proportion of board members (excluding the 
interlocking director) in an associated firm sharing the same demographic attribute i as 
the interlocking director. Hence, in an associated firm with a total of seven directors, if 
the interlocking director is an employed executive of a publicly traded firm, and five out 
of the remaining six board members in the associated firm are also employed executives, 
then Pi is 5/6. Hence, the values of (Pi)2 for occupation background homogeneity range 
from zero to one, with values closer to one indicating greater demographic homogeneity. 
All three demographic attributes were obtained from an associated firm's proxy 
statements.  
Hypothesis 6: Number of interlock types. The number of interlock types 
between a stigmatized and associated firm was measured using a dichotomous variable 
as follows: 
A value of 1 indicates the presence of a triple interlock (i.e., neutral, sent, and 
received interlocks) between the associated and stigmatized firms, and 
A value of 0 indicates otherwise. 
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The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statements of the 
stigmatized and associated firms. 
Hypothesis 7: Duration of director interlock. The duration of director interlock 
is a continuous variable. It was measured by counting the number of years that a director 
interlock present on the date(s) of the stigmatizing event has linked the stigmatized and 
associated firms. In the event that there is more than one director interlock type between 
the stigmatized and associated firms, the director interlock with the longest duration will 
be selected. The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statements of the 
associated and stigmatized firms. 
Hypothesis 8: Board size. Board size in an associated firm is a continuous 
variable. It was measured by counting the number of directors in the corporate board of 
an associated firm. The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statement of 
the associated firm. 
Hypothesis 9: Independent board chair. Whether the board chair is an 
independent director was measured using a dichotomous variable as follows: 
A value of 1 indicates that the board chair in the associated firm is an 
independent director (see below for the definition of an independent director), and 
A value of 0 indicates otherwise. 
The value of this variable was obtained from the proxy statement of the 
associated firm. 
Hypothesis 10: Proportion of independent directors. The proportion of 
independent directors was computed using the number of independent directors divided 
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by the total number of directors in the corporate board of an associated firm. I adopted 
the following classification of directors in a corporate board. Independent directors are 
representatives from other firms that do not have business relations with the company. 
Inside directors include those who work for the firm (active or retired) and their 
immediate family members. Affiliated directors include those who are closely associated 
with the firm but are not full-time employees, such as representatives from other firms 
that do business with the focal firm. The SEC requires public firms to disclose the 
identity of affiliated directors in their proxy statements (Daily et al., 1999). The required 
information to classify each director into one of the three categories was found in the 
proxy statement of the associated firm. 
Hypothesis 11: Ownership of independent directors. The ownership of 
independent directors is the total percentage of shares held by all the independent 
directors of an associated firm. This information was obtained from the proxy statement 
of the associated firm. 
Hypothesis 12: Ownership of activist institutional investors. The ownership 
of activist (or pressure-resistant) institutional investors is the total percentage of shares 
held by pension funds and professional investment funds of an associated firm. This 
information was obtained from the proxy statement of the associated firm. 
Hypothesis 13: Ownership of inside directors. The ownership of inside 
directors is the total percentage of shares held by all inside directors (including the CEO) 
of an associated firm. This information was obtained from the proxy statement of the 
associated firm. 
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Control Variables 
Other than the independent variables described above, I included the following 
control variables in the analysis. 
Strength of the stigmatizing event. The strength of the stigmatizing event may 
also influence the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. Specifically, the 
stigma experienced by an associated firm may be higher when the firm is associated with 
another firm highly stigmatized by an alleged accounting scandal when compared with a 
firm that is less stigmatized by an alleged accounting scandal. To account for this 
possibility, I included the cumulative abnormal returns of the stigmatized firm as a 
control variable. 
Relative size of the stigmatized and associated firms. The relative size of the 
stigmatized and associated firms may also influence the amount of stigma experienced 
by the associated firm. Larger firms are more visible and attract more attention than 
smaller-sized firms. As a result, large firms may generate more interests and feature 
more prominently in investors' impression formation process. Relative firm size was 
defined as the annual sales of the stigmatized firm less the annual sales of the associated 
firm. The annual sales figures (in billions) for the stigmatized and associated firms were 
extracted from COMPUSTAT. 
Prior firm performance of associated firms. Firm performance of an 
associated firm was included as a control variable to take into account its potential 
impact on the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. Specifically, higher 
performing firms may be less stigmatized when compared with lower performing firms. 
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I measured firm performance using return on assets and extracted the data from 
COMPUSTAT. 
Business relationships. An interlocking directorate between a stigmatized firm 
and an associated firm may represent some form of interdependence between the two 
firms. From a resource dependence perspective, director interlocks are one form of co-
optation mechanism where interdependent firms seek to influence one another through 
representations on the board (Mizruchi, 1996). To account for the possibility that 
business relationships between a stigmatized firm and an associated firm may influence 
the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm, I created a dummy variable 
with a value of one to represent the existence of business relations between the two 
firms, and zero otherwise. For instance, the dummy variable will have a value of one if 
an associated firm is a supplier to and/or customer of a stigmatized firm. The 
information for this dummy was obtained from the proxy statements of the stigmatized 
and associated firms. 
Year of the stigmatizing event. Media interests in accounting scandals have 
varied during the period of the study from 1998 to 2002. A search in the Lexis-Nexis 
database using the key words “SEC” and “investigate or inquiry” revealed the following 
number of news articles during the following periods: 166 articles in 1998, 224 articles 
in 1999, 346 articles in 2000, 370 articles in 2001, and 1,483 articles in 2002. Hence, 
media reports of accounting scandals have been more extensive after the Enron debacle 
was made public in year 2000 when compared with earlier years. The media blitz may 
have changed investors’ expectations of and reactions to news of alleged accounting 
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scandals during the period of study. Changes in investors’ expectations and reactions 
will influence the value of the cumulative abnormal returns for both the stigmatized and 
associated firms. To account for this possibility, I included the year of the stigmatizing 
event as a control variable. 
Industry of the associated firms. Investors’ reaction to the news of alleged 
accounting scandals may also differ according to the industry of the associated firms. 
For instance, associated firms in industries that sell services or finished goods directly to 
end-consumers are more visible to the public and may attract more attention when an 
alleged accounting scandal is announced. Therefore, associated firms in the airlines or 
beverage industries may experience more stigma when compared with associated firms 
in industries that largely provide business services or intermediate products, such as 
firms in the paper mill or metal forging industries. Furthermore, associated firms located 
in industries where firms are currently under SEC investigation may experience more 
stigma as a result of common industry membership. To account for these possibilities, I 
created dummy variables to capture the primary industry of the associated firms. All 
firms are classified into one of the following five industries using these firms’ primary 
SIC codes: (1) Minerals and Construction, (2) Transportation, Communications, and 
Utilities, (3) Wholesale and Retail Trade, (4) Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and 
Service, and (5) Manufacturing. Four dummy variables were included in the analysis 
with firms in the manufacturing industry assigned as the reference group. 
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CHAPTER VI 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations for 
the variables used in the study.  
Financial-Event Study 
I used financial-event study methodology to test hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 
states that firms with director interlocks to other firms stigmatized by alleged accounting 
scandals will, on the average, experience stigma as a result of the association. This 
hypothesis is strongly supported. Table 2 presents two significance tests of the 
cumulative abnormal return as suggested by McWilliams and Siegel (1997). The first is 
a standard parametric significance test, wherein a test statistic is computed to test the 
null hypothesis that the cumulative abnormal return is equal to zero. The second reported 
significance test is the generalized sign test, wherein the null hypothesis for the test is 
that the fraction of positive (or negative) returns is the same as in the estimation period. 
The generalized sign test is more robust to outliers than the standard parametric test 
(Cowan, 1992). Both test statistics should be significant to support hypothesis 1 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). 
 TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Among Study Variables 
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an d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Variablea Me s.
1 Stigma (Associated Firm) 1.0 1            9 2.8
2 Audit Chair (Stigmatized Firm) .16 37 7           
21 41 2 6          
33 47 0 9         
  12 14 05 5        
        
       
     
   
    
   
  
  
  
  
  
7 1   9 6 8 8 7 1 8 3
  
  1 2 9 7 6 5 2
  
  
  
  
  
. .1
13 Audit Chair (Associated Firm) . . . .2
4 Governance Chair (Associated Firm) . . . 7 -.14 -.0
05 Age Homogeneity . . . .13 -. 3 -.0
6 Tenure Homogeneity .28 .44 .09 .05 .07 .03 .00
7 Occupation Homogeneity
 
.33 .20 .09 .19 .02 .00 .05 .11
8 Triple Interlocks .01 .11 .09 .05 .12 .00 .02 -.04 -.05
9 Duration of Interlocks 
 
4.94 4.72 -.17 .03 .03 -.03 -.07 -.20 -.04 .04
10 Board Size 10.24 2.94 .10 -.08 -.15 -.10 -.08 -.13 -.16 .08 .05
11 Independent Board Chair .06 .23 .00 -.01 .04 .02 -.06 .15 .09 -.03 -.15 -.09
12 Proportion of Independent Directors .61 .21 -.10 -.14 -.08 -.01 .13 -.05 .03 .03 -.22 .17 .07
13 Ownership of Activist Institutional Investors 3.13 8.55 .03 .00 .05 .05 -.06 .05 -.03 -.04 -.07 -.08 .22
14 Ownership of Inside Directors 8.73 13.48 -.05 -.04 .06 .05 .01 .09 -.05 .20 -.04 -.11 -.03
15 Ownership of Independent Directors 8.85 14.25 -.05 .10 .08 -.08 -.10 .07 .07 -.04 .11 -.29 -.05
16 Stigma (Stigmatized Firm) 15.99 11.78 .08 .03 .13 .03 -.03 .11 .06 -.10 -.28 -.13 .00
17 Relative Firm Size 
 
15.03 29.2 .0 -.10 -.12 .1 -.0 .0 .0 -.0 -.0 -.0 -.0
18 Firm Performance -.02 .37 -.08 -.01 .00 -.11 .05 -.10 -.03 .01 .08 .11 -.32
19 Business Relationship 
 
.24 .70 -.03 .07 .06 .00 -.0 .1 -.0 .0 .1 -.0 .1
20 Year 2000.89 1.66 -.06 -.14 -.06 .00 .08 -.06 -.11 -.11 -.08 .08 -.03
21 Minerals and Construction Industry .05 .22 -.03 .10 .02 .00 .25 -.02 .16 -.03 -.05 -.09 -.06
22 Transportation, Communications, and Utilities Industry .11 .31 .04 .06 .10 -.02 .00 .12 .07 -.04 -.03 .09 .03
23 Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry .08 .27 .10 .07 .03 -.05 -.06 .02 -.06 -.03 .05 -.01 -.01
24 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Service Industry .33 .47 -.01 -.01 -.09 .01 -.07 .10 .01 -.08 -.08 .04 -.06
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  Variablea Mean s.d. 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23
13 Ownership of Activist Institutional Investors 3.13 8.55 .11            
14 Ownership of Inside Directors 8.73 13.48 -.15 -.04           
          
        
       
      
     
    
  
 
15 Ownership of Independent Directors 8.85 14.25 -.52 -.04 -.05
16 Stigma (Stigmatized Firm) 15.99 11.78 .10 .09 .00 -.07
17 Relative Firm Size 
 
15.03 29.27 -.01 .16 -.01 -.04 .00
18 Firm Performance -.02 .37 -.02 -.20 .05 .03 -.02 -.02
19 Business Relationship 
 
.24 .70 -.31 -.05 .04 .01 -.19 -.01 -.26
20 Year 2000.89 1.66 .18 .04 -.03 -.15 .00 .23 -.12 -.18     
21 Minerals and Construction Industry .05 .22 -.06 -.04 .04 .07 .07 -.02 .05 -.02 -.07
22 Transportation, Communications, and Utilities Industry .11 .31 .12 .01 .02 -.17 .05 -.03 .01 .05 .05 -.08   
23 Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry .08 .27 -.09 .21 -.01 .01 -.04 .05 -.03 .02 .01 -.07 -.11
24 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Service Industry .33 .47 -.17 .04 -.05 .09 .07 -.02 -.04 .09 -.08 -.16 -.25 -.21
a n = 244 firms. Correlations greater than .12 are significant at p < .05; correlations greater than .16 are significant at p < .01. 
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Event 
window 
 
Cumulative abnormal return 
(CAR)a
Negative:Positiveb Standard parametric t-test Generalized sign test 
-1, 0 -1.03% 399:214 -4.633*** -6.529*** 
-1     -0.36% 357:256 -2.310* -3.133***
0     -0.67% 376:237 -4.241*** -4.669***
+1     -0.16% 369:244 -0.994 -4.104***
+2     -0.16% 330:283 -1.012 -0.951
TABLE 2 
Results of Financial-Event Study for the Associated Firms
 
 
a The data are for announcement dates without confounding events. n = 613 event dates for 244 associated firms. 
b This column highlights the ratio of negative over positive abnormal returns for the 613 event dates. 
*p < .05 and ***p < .001 for a one-tailed test. 
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The results indicate that when the 30 firms were stigmatized due to an alleged 
accounting scandal, the 244 associated firms concurrently experienced an average 
decline of 1.03% in cumulative abnormal returns over a 2-day event window. This 
decline is highly statistically significant as indicated by the results of the standard 
parametric t-test and the generalized sign test (p < 0.001). Table 2 shows that the average 
decline of 1.03% over the 2-day event window was due to a statistically significant 
decline of 0.36% one day prior to the event date and a statistically significant decline of 
0.67% on the event date. Although the 244 associated firms also experienced an average 
decline of 0.16% one day after the event date, only the generalized sign test registered a 
significant change (p < 0.001) while the standard parametric t-test was insignificant (p > 
0.1). In addition, the generalized sign test and the standard parametric t-test were not 
significant (p > 0.1) for the average decline of 0.16% two days after the event date. 
These findings provided some support for the initial decision to use the (-1, 0) 2-day 
event window for the analysis. This two-day window is also consistent with the 
recommendation of McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for studies that use the financial 
event methodology. Other than the results of the significance tests, Table 2 also indicates 
that out of the 613 event dates used for the 244 associated firms, 399 event dates (65%) 
registered a negative cumulative abnormal return while only 214 event dates (35%) had 
a positive cumulative abnormal return. 
Further analysis (not reported in Table 2) revealed that 164 (67.2%) out of the 
244 associated firms experienced a negative cumulative abnormal return over the 2-day 
event window. Forty-five (27.4%) out of these 164 associated firms registered 
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significant negative cumulative abnormal returns over the 2-day event window. These 
forty-five associated firms were interlocked with eighteen firms stigmatized due to an 
alleged accounting scandal. In other words, eighteen (60%) out of the thirty firms 
stigmatized due to an alleged accounting scandal were interlocked with at least one 
associated firm that experienced a significant negative cumulative abnormal return over 
the 2-day event window. Of the thirty stigmatized firms, eleven (37%) firms were 
interlocked with at least one associated firm that experienced a negative (but 
insignificant) cumulative abnormal return over the 2-day event window. Only one firm 
stigmatized due to an alleged accounting scandal was interlocked with an associated firm 
that experienced a positive (but insignificant) cumulative abnormal return over the 2-day 
event window. 
Multiple Regression 
The financial event study results indicate that associated firms experience 
different amounts of stigma through the network of director interlock(s). The analysis in 
this section attempts to explain the variation in the stigma experienced by the associated 
firms. I used ordinary least square (OLS) regression to test hypotheses 2 to 13. The 
regression model has fourteen independent variables, nine control variables, and a 
sample size of 244 observations. The cumulative abnormal returns for the 244 associated 
firms were reversed coded (i.e., multiplied by -1) and used as the dependent variable in 
the regression model. Hence, a more positive reverse-coded cumulative abnormal return 
is indicative of a higher stigma experienced by an associated firm. 
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A sample size of 244 firms achieves 86% statistical power to detect a small effect 
size of 0.10 when the potential for Type I error is set at 0.05. This is higher than the 
minimum of 80% recommended by Cohen (1987). In addition, Green (1991) suggests 
that the minimum sample size required to test for multiple correlations and individual 
predictors are “50 + 8m” and “104 + m” respectively, where m is the number of 
variables. Since there are twenty-three variables in the regression model, the minimum 
sample size required for testing multiple correlations and individual predictors are 234 
and 127 respectively. The current sample size of 244 observations is above the minimum 
sample size suggested by Green (1991). 
Multicollinearity did not pose a problem as the variance inflation factors for the 
OLS regression model ranged from 1.11 to 1.99, with a mean of 1.30 (Chatterjee, Hadi, 
& Price, 2000). All continuous variables in the model were centered prior to running the 
regression analysis. The reported t-tests results use one-tailed p-values for the 
independent variables and two-tailed p-values otherwise. Table 3 presents the results of 
the analysis. 
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TABLE 3 
Results of Multiple Regression Tests on Stigma of the Associated Firms 
Variable Ordinary Least Squares 
 (1) (2)  (3)
 β s.e.  Robust s.e.
Intercept -.10 .12  .11  
Audit Chair (Stigmatized Firm) .25 .18 † .20  
Audit Chair (Associated Firm) .29 .16 * .16 * 
Governance Chair (Associated Firm) .24 .13 * .13 * 
Age Homogeneity .75 .45 * .21 ***
Tenure Homogeneity .16 .15  .12 † 
Occupation Homogeneity .38 .32  .31  
Triple Interlocks 1.03 .56 * .40 ** 
Duration of Interlocks -.04 .01  .01  
Board Size .05 .02 * .02 * 
Independent Board Chair -.21 .28  .31  
Proportion of Independent Directors -1.71 .40 *** .49 ***
Ownership of Independent Directors  .01 .07  .08  
Ownership of Activist Investors -.16 .05 *** .05 ***
Ownership of Inside Directors -.12 .04 ** .04 ** 
Control Variables:   
Stigma (Stigmatized Firm) .00 .01  .01  
Relative Firm Size .00 .00  .00  
Firm Performance -.31 .19  .38  
Business Relationship -.18 .10 † .10 † 
Year -.04 .04  .04  
Minerals and Construction Industry -.42 .30  .28  
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities Industry .01 .21  .23  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry .38 .23  .26  
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Service Industry -.16 .15  .15  
Model F (df) 2.97 (23, 220) *** 3.97 (23, 220) ***
Overall R2 .24 .24
Adjusted R2 .16
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
t-tests are one-tailed for the independent variables and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Column 1 presents the beta coefficients of the OLS regression model, with the 
corresponding standard errors listed in column 2. The overall model was highly 
significant (F = 2.97, p < 0.001) with a R2 value of 0.24 and an adjusted R2 value of 
0.16. Prior to interpreting the results of the regression analysis, I performed two 
statistical tests to verify that the normality and variance of the residuals are consistent 
with the assumptions of the OLS model. First, I applied the Shapiro-Wilk test on the 
residuals to check for normality. When a distribution is normal, the values of skewness 
and kurtosis are zero. The test statistic rejected the null hypothesis of normal distribution 
(W = 0.97, p < 0.001). Further analysis revealed that the null hypothesis was rejected 
largely because of the kurtosis (kurtosis statistic = 5.51) rather than the skewness 
(skewness statistic = 0.50) of the residual’s distribution. The problem with a positive 
kurtosis is that it produces an underestimate of the variance of a variable. Although the 
Shapiro-Wilk test rejected the null hypothesis of normal distribution, Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2001) suggest that looking at the shape of a distribution instead of using formal 
inference tests may be better for large samples. According to Tabachnick and Fidell, the 
standard errors for both skewness and kurtosis decrease with larger sample sizes, hence 
“the null hypothesis is likely to be rejected with large samples when there are only minor 
deviations from normality” (2001: 74). Miller (1997) also highlighted the importance of 
viewing the shape of a distribution instead of simply relying on formal inference tests on 
normality.  
Figure 2 shows the normal p-p plot and Figure 3 shows the quantile-normal plot 
of the residuals. While the normal p-p plot puts the focus on the center of the 
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distribution, the quantile-normal plot emphasizes the tails of the distribution. Hence, 
simultaneously observing both plots provides a better picture of the residual’s 
distribution. Both plots reveal that the deviation from normality is minimal. 
Furthermore, underestimates of the variance of a variable associated with the positive 
kurtosis of the residuals tend to disappear with samples of 100 or more cases 
(Waternaux, 1976). Since 244 observations were used in the regression model, the 
potential problem of positive kurtosis is mitigated and should not create any serious 
problems for statistical inferences. Figure 3 also reveals the presence of potential 
influential observations or outliers. I shall address the problem of influential 
observations later in this chapter. 
Second, I carried out a Breusch-Pagan test on the residuals to verify that the OLS 
assumption of homoskedasticity was not violated. The test statistic rejected the null 
hypothesis of constant variance (χ2 = 52.29, p < 0.001), which suggests the presence of 
heteroskedasticity. To correct for the heteroskedasticity of the residuals, the standard 
errors in the regression model were replaced with the Huber-White robust standard 
errors (White, 1980, 1982). These robust standard errors are reported in column 3 (with 
the estimated beta coefficients unchanged as listed in column 1). The overall model 
remains highly significant (F = 3.97, p < 0.001) with a R2 value of 0.24. I shall interpret 
the results using the robust standard errors in column 3. 
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FIGURE 2 
Normal P-P Plot of Residuals 
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FIGURE 3 
Quantile-Normal Plot of Residuals 
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Hypotheses 2 to 4 suggest that the characteristics of an interlocking director have 
an impact on the amount of stigma. Hypothesis 2 predicted that an interlocking director 
holding the position of audit chair in a stigmatized firm is positively associated with the 
amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. This hypothesis is not supported. 
The coefficient for audit chair of the stigmatized firm (b = 0.25, p > 0.1) is insignificant, 
hence not distinguished from zero. Hypothesis 3 predicted that an interlocking director 
holding the position of audit chair in an associated firm is positively associated with the 
amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. This hypothesis is supported. The 
coefficient for audit chair of the associated firm is significant (b = 0.29, p < 0.05). 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that an interlocking director holding the position of corporate 
governance chair in an associated firm is positively associated with the amount of stigma 
experienced by the associated firm. This hypothesis is also supported. The coefficient for 
corporate governance chair of the associated firm is significant (b = 0.24, p < 0.05).  
Hypothesis 5 suggests that the characteristics of the board in an associated firm 
have an impact on the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. Specifically, 
age, tenure, and occupation background homogeneity of an interlocking director with 
other corporate board members in an associated firm are positively associated with the 
amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. The results provide some support 
for this hypothesis. The coefficients for age homogeneity (b = 0.75, p < 0.001) and 
tenure homogeneity (b = 0.16, p < 0.1) are significant. However, the coefficient for 
occupation background homogeneity (b = 0.38, p > 0.1) is insignificant, hence not 
distinguished from zero. 
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Hypotheses 6 and 7 suggest that the amount of stigma experienced by an 
associated firm will be higher when the firm has a stronger connection to a stigmatized 
firm through the network of director interlock(s). Hypothesis 6 predicted that associated 
firms with triple interlocks to stigmatized firms experience more stigma when compared 
with associated firms with single or dual interlocks to stigmatized firms. The results 
support this hypothesis. The coefficient for an associated firm with triple interlocks to a 
stigmatized firm is significant (b = 1.03, p < 0.01), suggesting that associated firms with 
triple interlocks (i.e., the presence of sent, received, and neutral interlocks) to 
stigmatized firms experienced the strongest stigma. Contrary to expectations, hypothesis 
7 is not supported. Hypothesis 7 predicted that the duration of director interlocks 
between a stigmatized firm and an associated firm is positively associated with the 
amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. However, the coefficient for 
duration of interlocks (b = -0.04, p > 0.9) is not significantly different from zero. 
Hypotheses 8 to 13 suggest that corporate governance mechanisms in an 
associated firm have an impact on the amount of stigma experienced by the associated 
firm. Hypothesis 8 predicted that board size in an associated firm is positively associated 
with the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. The results support this 
hypothesis. The coefficient for board size in an associated firm is positive and significant 
(b = 0.05, p < 0.05). Hypotheses 10, 12, and 13 predicted that the proportion of 
independent directors (H10), the ownership of activist institutional investors (H12), and 
inside directors’ ownership (H13) in an associated firm are negatively associated with 
the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. These hypotheses are 
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supported. The coefficients for the proportion of independent directors (b = -1.71, p < 
0.001), ownership of activist institutional investors (b = -0.16, p < 0.001), and ownership 
of inside directors (b = -0.12, p < 0.01) are significant. Hypotheses 9 and 11 predicted 
that the presence of an independent board chair (H9) and the ownership of independent 
directors (H11) in an associated firm are negatively associated with the amount of stigma 
experienced by the associated firm. These hypotheses are not supported. The coefficient 
for independent board chair is insignificant (b = -0.21, p > 0.1). The coefficient for the 
ownership of independent directors is also insignificant (b = 0.01, p > 0.9). 
The associations of the control variables with the dependent variable are also 
reported. The coefficient for the presence of a business relationship between a 
stigmatized firm and an associated firm is negative and significant (b = -0.18, p < 0.1), 
suggesting that an associated firm with existing business ties to a stigmatized firm 
experience lower amounts of stigma. The remaining four control variables are not 
significant (p > 0.1). 
Robust Regression 
Figure 3 suggests that the presence of potential influential observations or 
outliers may account for the results highlighted above. I used iteratively reweighted least 
squares (IRLS) robust regression to verify the plausibility that some of the reported 
relationships may be driven by influential observations in the sample (Byrd & Hickman, 
1992; Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1989). IRLS robust regression involves both robust 
estimation of the regression coefficients and the standard errors. This approach is useful 
in situations where there are large outliers and observations with large leverage values.  
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According to Neter et al. (1989), leverage values greater than 2p/n are considered 
influential observations, where p is the number of regression parameters in the model 
including the intercept term and n is the sample size. Since p is twenty-four and n is 244 
in this study, observations with leverage values greater than 0.197 are considered 
influential. Twelve observations have leverage values exceeding 0.197. Hence, IRLS 
robust regression was used to determine if the reported results from the OLS regression 
were an artifact of influential observations in the sample. 
IRLS robust regression uses weighted least squares to reduce the influence of 
outlying cases by employing weights that vary inversely with the size of the residual. 
The procedure uses two kinds of weighting, Huber weights and Biweights originated by 
Tukey (Beaton & Tukey, 1974; Huber, 1964). Table 4 reports the beta coefficients and 
the corresponding standard errors for the IRLS robust regression. 
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TABLE 4 
Results of Robust Regression Tests on Stigma of the Associated Firms 
Variable IRLS Robust Regression 
 β s.e.
Intercept -.22 .11 * 
Audit Chair (Stigmatized Firm) .06 .16  
Audit Chair (Associated Firm) .39 .14 ** 
Governance Chair (Associated Firm) .29 .12 ** 
Age Homogeneity .82 .40 * 
Tenure Homogeneity .12 .13  
Occupation Homogeneity .20 .29  
Triple Interlocks .96 .51 * 
Duration of Interlocks -.03 .01  
Board Size .03 .02 † 
Independent Board Chair .13 .26  
Proportion of Independent Directors -.96 .36 ** 
Ownership of Independent Directors  -.08 .07  
Ownership of Activist Investors -.14 .04 *** 
Ownership of Inside Directors -.08 .04 * 
Control Variables:  
Stigma (Stigmatized Firm) .00 .00  
Relative Firm Size .00 .00  
Firm Performance -.33 .29  
Business Relationship -.07 .09  
Year -.05 .04  
Minerals and Construction Industry -.39 .27  
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities Industry -.12 .19  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry .33 .21  
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Service Industry .01 .14  
Model F (df) 2.53 (23, 219) *** 
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
t-tests are one-tailed for the independent variables and two-tailed otherwise. 
 
 88
Overall, the results of the IRLS robust regression provided some assurance that 
the earlier reported results are not attributed to the presence of influential observations. 
Hypotheses 3, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, and 13 continue to be supported without any appreciable 
difference. Hypothesis 5 still receives some support. The coefficients for age 
homogeneity (b = 0.82, p < 0.05) and occupation background homogeneity (b = 0.20, p 
> 0.1) remain significant and insignificant respectively, as per the multiple regression 
analysis. However, the coefficient for tenure homogeneity (b = 0.12, p > 0.1), which is 
significant under the multiple regression analysis, is now insignificant. The remaining 
hypotheses (i.e., hypotheses 2, 7, 9, and 11) remain unsupported under the IRLS robust 
regression. 
Logistic Regression 
I performed a logistic regression to determine if the results are sensitive to how 
the dependent variable is measured. In the earlier analyses, I used the cumulative 
abnormal returns of the associated firms over the 2-day event window as a measure of 
the amount of stigma. I used a continuous dependent variable in the previous analyses 
because I wish to explain the effect size of the stigma. However, as noted in the previous 
section, only forty-five (18.4%) out of the 244 associated firms experienced significant 
stigma, i.e., registered a significant negative cumulative abnormal return over the 2-day 
event window. In this analysis, I used a dummy dependent variable (coded as 1 if an 
associated firm has a significant negative cumulative abnormal return over the 2-day 
event window; 0 otherwise) to check if the independent variables also explain whether 
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an associated firm experienced a statistically significant stigma or not. Table 5 presents 
the results of the logistic regression analysis. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present the beta coefficients and the corresponding 
odds ratio for each independent variable. Similar to Table 3, two types of standard errors 
are reported. Column 3 lists the standard errors without adjusting for heteroskedasticity, 
while column 4 lists the robust standard errors. There are no appreciable differences in 
the results between columns 3 and 4. Hence, I shall interpret the results using the robust 
standard errors in column 4. 
The overall model is significant (χ2 = 46.03, p < 0.001) with a pseudo R2 value of 
0.24. The results are similar to those of the IRLS robust regression, with the following 
exceptions. Hypothesis 5 suggests that the age, tenure, and occupation background 
homogeneity of an interlocking director with other corporate board members in an 
associated firm are positively associated with the amount of stigma experienced by the 
associated firm. When the demographic homogeneity of board members in an associated 
firm is used to predict the likelihood that the associated firm is stigmatized, the 
coefficients for age homogeneity (b = 0.03, p > 0.1) and occupation homogeneity (b =    
-0.74, p > 0.9) are not significant. However, the coefficient for tenure homogeneity, 
which is not significant under the multiple regression and IRLS robust regression 
analyses, is now significant (b = 0.79, p < 0.05) when predicting the likelihood that an 
associated firm is stigmatized. 
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TABLE 5 
Results of Logistics Regression Tests on Stigma of the Associated Firms 
Variable Logistic Regression 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4)
β Odds Ratio
s.e.  Robust s.e.
Intercept -2.73  .45 *** .47 *** 
Audit Chair (Stigmatized Firm) .71 2.03 1.06 † 1.24  
Audit Chair (Associated Firm) 1.16 3.20 1.56 ** 1.47 ** 
Governance Chair (Associated Firm) 1.32 3.76 1.61 ** 1.57 ** 
Age Homogeneity .03 1.03 1.86  .89  
Tenure Homogeneity .79 2.21 .92 * .80 * 
Occupation Homogeneity -.74 .48 .51  .48  
Triple Interlocks 2.73 15.35 22.45 * 27.39 † 
Duration of Interlocks -.01 .99 .05  .05  
Board Size .11 1.12 .08 † .08 † 
Independent Board Chair .03 1.03 1.01  1.02  
Proportion of Independent Directors -2.59 .08 .10 * .09 * 
Ownership of Independent Directors  -.38 .69 .19 † .18 † 
Ownership of Activist Investors -.34 .71 .11 * .11 * 
Ownership of Inside Directors -.49 .61 .09 *** .09 *** 
Control Variables:    
Stigma (Stigmatized Firm) .01 1.01 .02  .02  
Relative Firm Size .01 1.01 .01  .01  
Firm Performance -.45 .64 .42  .27  
Business Relationship -.68 .51 .19 † .16 * 
Year -.24 .78 .10 † .11 † 
Minerals and Construction Industry .17 1.19 1.18  .97  
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities Industry -.43 .65 .50  .49  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry 1.28 3.61 2.55 † 2.36 † 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Service Industry -.06 .94 .46  .48  
Log-Likelihood -88.97  -88.97
χ2 (df) 55.35 (23) *** 46.03 (23) *** 
Pseudo R2 .24 .24
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
t-tests are one-tailed for the independent variables and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Hypothesis 11 predicted that the ownership of independent directors in an 
associated firm is negatively associated with the amount of stigma experienced by the 
associated firm. Although this hypothesis is not supported under the previous regression 
analyses, the coefficient for ownership of independent directors is now significant (b =   
-0.38, p < 0.1) when predicting the likelihood that an associated firm is stigmatized. 
Overall, the results of the logistic regression provided some assurance that the 
earlier reported results are robust to an alternative measure of the dependent variable, 
and that the theoretical framework developed in this paper may also be used to explain 
whether an associated firm experienced a statistically significant stigma or not. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to examine whether firms associated 
by director interlock(s) with other firms stigmatized by an alleged accounting scandal 
also experience stigma. Specifically, firms stigmatized as a result of an alleged 
accounting scandal may, on the average, induce investors to stigmatize other firms 
connected by director interlocks. I drew from the social psychology literature to provide 
the theoretical thrust for examining the stigma construct at the inter-organizational level. 
In particular, I used theories on attribution, member-to-group inferences, and social 
exchange reciprocity to argue for the phenomenon of stigma by association between 
organizational entities. The results of the dissertation present strong evidence in support 
of the concept of stigma by association between organizations in the context of corporate 
accounting scandals. 
I further adopted an information-based approach to argue that firms associated 
with stigmatized firms will experience different amounts of stigma, and some firms may 
experience no stigma at all. I applied social inference theories and agency theory to 
develop four categories of variables that may influence the amount of stigma 
experienced by associated firms. The results of the dissertation present strong evidence 
in support of most of the hypotheses. The characteristics of the interlocking director, the 
characteristics of the board, the strength of the director interlock, and the quality of 
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corporate governance in an associated firm appear to influence the amount of stigma 
experienced by the firm. 
Discussion of Results 
The results suggest that the formal position of an interlocking director influences 
the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. However, investors appear to 
only consider the position of the interlocking director in the associated firm. 
Specifically, the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm increases when the 
interlocking director is the audit committee chair or the corporate governance committee 
chair in the associated firm. Whether the interlocking director is the audit committee 
chair of the firm accused of an accounting scandal did not have any impact on the 
amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. One reason for this result is that 
investors are making inferences on the likelihood that associated firms have also 
deviated from some norms, whether accounting or non-accounting in nature. As a result, 
the formal positions of the interlocking director in the associated firm are more relevant 
for investors when making such inferences when compared with the interlocking 
director’s formal positions in the stigmatized firm. For instance, even if the interlocking 
director is an audit committee chair of a firm accused of an accounting scandal, the 
ability of this director to influence investors’ perceptions of an associated firm is limited 
if this director does not hold any position of power or influence in the associated firm. 
Since detecting deviations from accounting or non-accounting norms is within the 
purview of the audit and corporate governance committees respectively, investors are 
likely to focus their attention on the chair positions of these committees when forming 
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impressions about the associated firm. This explanation is consistent with the notion that 
“an individual attributes effects to those causal factors with which they covary, rather 
than to those from which they are relatively independent” (Harvey & Weary, 1984: 435). 
The significant findings for the position of an interlocking director in an 
associated firm underscore the importance of the director for stigma by association to 
occur between firms. While holding directorship positions may engender an increase in a 
director’s reputation (Deutsch & Ross, 2003; Yermack, 2004), this study suggests that 
investors are likely to attribute blame and responsibility to the director in the context of 
unexpected negative outcomes, such as an alleged accounting scandal. Although a 
directorship position in publicly listed firms is unlike some occupations that are 
instinctively stigmatized (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999), directors should be aware that 
organizational outcomes, good or bad, are largely attributed to them regardless of their 
ability to control these outcomes (Meindl, 1990; Meindl et al., 1985). When outcomes 
are bad, such as an alleged accounting scandal, investors may stigmatize the directors in 
the firm. The stigma may accompany the director to other organizations that he or she is 
associated with, and subsequently “infect” these other organizations. This phenomenon 
of stigma by association through the interlocking director is likely to expose the director 
to expost settling up consequences that may reduce the employability or reputation of the 
director in other settings. 
The characteristics of the board in an associated firm also appear to influence the 
amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. However, the results are mixed 
and less conclusive. For instance, the amount of stigma experienced by an associated 
 
 95
firm increases when the directors in the associated firm have higher age homogeneity. 
However, age homogeneity of corporate boards in associated firms does not predict the 
likelihood that associated firms are stigmatized. Instead, the tenure homogeneity of 
corporate boards in associated firms is positively correlated with the likelihood that 
firms are stigmatized by association with firms accused of an accounting scandal. 
Occupation background homogeneity did not influence the amount of stigma 
experienced by an associated firm or the likelihood that associated firms are stigmatized. 
One reason for the mixed results is that the use of demographic variables as proxies for 
investors’ perceptions of directors’ attitudes and dispositions is flawed. For instance, 
Priem, Lyon, and Dess (1999) highlighted the inadequacies of using demographic 
variables as proxies for psychographic variables because the use of demographic 
variables sacrifice construct validity for measurement reliability. Unfortunately, data on 
investors’ perceptions of attitudinal and behavioral similarities of directors in associated 
firms are not available for analyses. I dropped these variables in subsequent analyses to 
verify if the results for the other hypotheses remain the same. Table 6 presents the beta 
coefficients for the OLS, IRLS robust, and logistic regressions. 
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TABLE 6 
Results of Regression Analyses Without Homogeneity Variables 
Variable 
OLS with 
Robust s.e. IRLS Robust Logistic 
β β  β
Intercept -.13  -.24 ** -2.77 *** 
Audit Chair (Stigmatized Firm) .33 † .11  .70  
Audit Chair (Associated Firm) .27 † .38 ** 1.17 ** 
Governance Chair (Associated Firm) .23 * .28 ** 1.27 ** 
Triple Interlocks 1.00 * .95 * 2.59 † 
Duration of Interlocks -.05  -.04  -.03  
Board Size .04 * .02  .12 † 
Independent Board Chair -.16  .15  .01  
Proportion of Independent Directors -1.59 *** -.88 ** -2.18 * 
Ownership of Independent Directors  -.01  -.09 † -.40 † 
Ownership of Activist Investors -.15 ** -.13 ** -.30 * 
Ownership of Inside Directors -.12 ** -.09 * -.44 ** 
Control Variables:     
Stigma (Stigmatized Firm) .00  .00  .01  
Relative Firm Size .00  .00  .01  
Firm Performance -.30  -.35  -.47  
Business Relationship -.18 † -.06  -.51  
Year -.04  -.05  -.24 † 
Minerals and Construction Industry -.25  -.26  .02  
Transportation, Communications, and Utilities Industry .07  -.10  -.04  
Wholesale and Retail Trade Industry .37  .32  1.40 ** 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate, and Service Industry -.12  .04  .01  
Model F (df) 2.61(20,223)*** 2.69(20,222)*** 
Overall R2 .22  
Log-Likelihood  -90.83
χ2 (df) 44.9(20)**
Pseudo R2  .22
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 
t-tests are one-tailed for the independent variables and two-tailed otherwise. 
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Overall, Table 6 reveals that the results reported in the previous chapter are not 
significantly different when the three board homogeneity variables are removed from the 
analyses. Hypotheses 3, 4, 6, 10, 12 and 13 continue to receive support. Hypothesis 8 
predicted that board size in an associated firm is positively associated with the amount of 
stigma experienced by the associated firm. Although this hypothesis receives support 
under OLS regression using robust standard errors (b = 0.04, p < 0.05), the hypothesis is 
not supported under the IRLS robust regression (b = 0.02, p > 0.1). In addition, board 
size in associated firms significantly predicts the likelihood that associated firms are 
stigmatized under the logistic regression (b = 0.12, p < 0.1). Hypothesis 11 predicted that 
the ownership of independent directors in an associated firm is negatively associated 
with the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. Although this hypothesis 
is not supported under OLS regression using robust standard errors (b = -0.01, p > 0.1), 
this hypothesis receives support under the IRLS robust regression (b = -0.09, p < 0.1). 
Furthermore, the ownership of independent directors in associated firms also 
significantly predicts the likelihood that associated firms are stigmatized under the 
logistic regression (b = 0.40, p < 0.1). 
The strength of the director interlock also influences the amount of stigma 
experienced by an associated firm. As expected, associated firms with triple interlocks to 
firms accused of accounting scandals experience more stigma when compared with 
associations based on single or dual interlocks. However, contrary to expectations, the 
duration of interlocks between firms has no impact on the amount of stigma experienced 
by an associated firm. One possible explanation for this result is that an interlocking 
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director with long tenure indicates high quality performance and good reputation. The 
blame of the alleged scandal appears to be placed on the relatively unknown, untested 
directors whose tenure has been relatively short. Another possible explanation is that the 
duration of interlocks between firms does not feature prominently in investors’ 
perceptions because it is not vivid or readily available. Harvey and Weary (1984) 
highlighted that the salience of stimuli influences the attribution of causality, an 
assertion that is consistent with the findings of Taylor and Fiske (1975). Since the 
duration of interlocks between two firms is not directly reported by publicly listed firms, 
investors may be less willing to expend effort to determine the duration, but instead rely 
on other information cues that are relatively easy to recall, such as the number of 
interlock types between firms (Smith & Miller, 1979; Taylor & Thompson, 1982). 
Finally, the quality of corporate governance in an associated firm appears to 
influence the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. As predicted, board 
size, the proportion of independent directors, the ownership of activist institutional 
investors, and the ownership of inside directors in an associated firm influence on the 
amount of stigma experienced by the firm. Although the ownership of independent 
directors does not influence the amount of stigma experienced by associated firms, it 
does predict the likelihood that associated firms are stigmatized. The independence of 
the board chair in an associated firm does not have any impact on the amount of stigma 
experienced by or the likelihood of stigmatization of the association firm. One possible 
reason for the insignificance of the independent board chair variable is that governance 
mechanisms can act as substitutes for one another (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001; 
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Rediker & Seth, 1995). In other words, when investors formulate impressions on the 
likelihood that associated firms have deviated from some norms, they may pay more 
attention to the overall quality of governance in the associated firms. The independence 
of a board chair may have little bearing on the overall quality of a firm’s governance 
mechanisms because having a CEO as the board chair may be beneficial to a firm under 
certain circumstances (Kang & Zardkoohi, 2005). When the CEO is allowed to 
concurrently hold the board chair position, other governance mechanisms, such as a 
higher ownership of inside directors or a higher proportion of independent directors, may 
be enhanced to substitute for the lack of independence in the board chair. 
The Mechanism of Stigma by Association 
Several researchers have lamented the need for further inquiry into the 
mechanism for stigma by association (Goldstein & Johnson, 1997; Jones et al., 1984). 
According to Neuberg et al. (1994), stigma by association may occur when individuals 
associated with stigmatized individuals are perceived to have also deviated from norms, 
or alternatively, individuals are stigmatized simply because of their association with 
stigmatized individuals and not because the former is perceived to have deviated from 
any norms. The results of this dissertation offer empirical evidence in support of the 
former mechanism for stigma by association between organizations in the context of 
corporate accounting scandals. If firms are simply stigmatized because of their 
association with other stigmatized firms, then we would expect the duration of 
interlocks, a proxy for the strength of association, to have a significant positive influence 
on the amount of stigma experienced by the associated firm. The results of this study 
 
 100
failed to support the hypothesis. Instead, associated firms experienced more stigma when 
the interlocking directors hold the audit or governance committee chair positions in the 
associated firm, or when the governance mechanism of the associated firm is weak. 
These findings are consistent with the assertion that investors stigmatize associated firms 
because of their perception that these firms may have deviated from some norms, 
whether accounting or non-accounting in nature.  
However, this study also found that associations based on triple interlocks result 
in more stigma experienced by associated firms when compared with associations based 
on single or dual interlocks. Since the number of interlock types is also a proxy for the 
strength of association, this result may be interpreted as firms experiencing stigma 
simply because of their association with firms accused of accounting scandals. However, 
the finding for the number of interlock types may also be interpreted as investors 
stigmatizing associated firms because of their perception that these firms may have 
deviated from some norms. This is because the greater the number of interlock types 
between firms, the more likely associated firms may have come to know of and adopt 
misleading accounting practices. Furthermore, investors are more likely to perceive 
ineffective board vigilance in an associated firm if three interlocking directors sit on the 
board of the firm when compared with the case of one or two interlocking directors on 
the board of the associated firm.  
Overall, the results of this dissertation suggest that associated firms are 
stigmatized because investors perceive the likelihood that these firms may have deviated 
from some norms, rather than simply because of an association with a firm accused of an 
 
 101
accounting scandal. In other words, the presence of an association with a firm accused of 
an accounting scandal is a necessary but insufficient condition for associated firms to 
experience stigma. 
I have focused this dissertation on the network of interlocking directors as a 
channel in which associated firms experience stigma. As highlighted earlier, director 
interlocks is only one way in which firms are associated with each other. While it is 
possible that other channels of association, such as common industry membership or 
strategic alliances, may facilitate the phenomenon of stigma by association between 
firms, the relevance of the different channels of association hinges upon the mechanism 
by which stigma by association occurs. If associated firms are stigmatized because 
investors perceive these firms as having deviated from some norms, then the appropriate 
channel for associated firms to experience stigma must be conducive for investors to 
form such perceptions. For instance, the network of interlocking directors is a relevant 
channel of association because investors’ attribution of blame or responsibility on the 
interlocking director(s) for the alleged accounting scandal is likely to lead to the 
perception that associated firms may have deviated from some norms. Likewise, 
common industry membership may be another relevant channel of association to the 
extent that the alleged misleading accounting practice may be perceived as an industry 
practice which was not formerly challenged by the regulatory agencies. However, 
associations based on strategic alliances may be less likely to result in stigma by 
association in the context of accounting scandals since alliances are largely formed for 
purposes of creating or sustaining a firm’s competitive advantage (Hoskisson, Hitt, & 
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Ireland, 2004). Clearly, future work on the link between the channels of association 
between firms and the phenomenon of stigma by association is warranted. 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
The findings have several implications for research and practice. First, although 
researchers have examined firm stigma from corporate scandals or bankruptcy 
(Alexander, 1999; Karpoff & Lott, 1993; Sutton & Callahan, 1987), no study has 
considered the plausibility of stigma by association between organizations. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study that applied theories in social psychology to explain the 
phenomenon of stigma by association at the inter-organizational level. 
Second, director interlocks between firms may have the unintended consequence 
of facilitating the process of stigma by association between firms. Extant studies have 
primarily focused on the positive or intended consequences of director interlocks, such 
as co-opting elements of the environment or as conduits of information flow (Mizruchi, 
1996). This study adopted a different approach by raising awareness that director 
interlocks may have unintended consequences. Specifically, a focal firm’s market value 
is influenced by the characteristics of other firms to which the focal firm has a 
connection with via director interlocks. If a focal firm has a director interlock with 
another firm that has experienced a stigmatizing event, then the focal firm may also 
experience a loss in market value as a result of associations through the network of 
director interlock(s). Furthermore, while extant studies found evidence that an 
organizational image is closely intertwined with the image of its corporate leaders 
(Sutton & Callahan, 1987), this study further suggests that an executive’s image at the 
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place of employment may spill over to other firms that appoint the executive as a 
director. Hence, while Sutton and Callahan (1987) found that a discrediting predicament, 
such as corporate bankruptcy, may spoil the image of a bankrupt firm’s top executives, 
this study provides evidence that an executive with a spoiled image may cause a decline 
in the market value of a firm that is associated with the executive. Such spillover effects 
arising from the image of corporate leaders has received little research attention. 
Third, the results of this dissertation have several implications for public policy 
makers and practitioners. Public policy makers should be aware that the social cost of 
accounting scandals may have been previously underestimated given that stigma from 
alleged scandals may also be experienced by associated firms. In other words, investors’ 
losses from alleged accounting scandals are not limited to the firms accused of having 
adopted misleading accounting practices. Rather, investors in associated firms also 
experience a loss in wealth as a result of these firms’ associations with firms accused of 
an accounting scandal. The findings of this dissertation provide an important insight on 
the consequences of accounting scandals given that the social costs of these scandals 
should be a salient factor in public policy decisions regarding the extent of regulation or 
the intensity of regulatory enforcement. 
Finally, the phenomenon of stigma by association through the network of 
director interlock(s) has two implications for the upper echelons of publicly traded firms. 
First, upper echelons of publicly traded firms may benefit from this dissertation by 
increasing their awareness of passive factors that influence the value of a firm. Although 
it is widely understood that effective strategic actions and responses create value for 
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investors, the possibility that existing director interlocks to stigmatized firms can 
decrease investor wealth is not obvious. An increase in awareness facilitates the 
implementation of effective responses that mitigate the negative consequences of 
stigmatization. For instance, increasing the quality of corporate governance may lessen 
the impact of stigma. Investors also appear to consider the formal positions of 
interlocking directors in board committees when making judgments on stigma by 
association. Hence, instituting the practice of rotating board members with formal 
positions in board committees may also help firms decrease the incidence or amount of 
stigma experienced by an associated firm. 
Second, the nominating committees of publicly traded firms must carefully 
review the composition of corporate boards. Not only should current and potential 
directors be evaluated based on their ability and willingness to maximize investors’ 
wealth, the evaluation should also include a list of firms that each director is associated 
with through the director interlock channel. Current or potential directors linked to firms 
that are experiencing discrediting predicaments, such as alleged corporate scandals, may 
lead to a decline in investors’ wealth. Hence, terminating or not establishing director 
interlocks with firms stigmatized by alleged accounting scandals may decrease the 
incidence or amount of stigma experienced by a firm. Furthermore, appointing directors 
that increase board diversity in demographic attributes, such as age and tenure, may also 
lessen the impact of stigma. 
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Limitations and Future Research 
The present study has its limitations. First, although event study methodology has 
been extensively used in previous research in multiple disciplines such as economics, 
management, and finance, the usefulness of this technique is heavily dependent on a set 
of strong assumptions, such as efficient markets and the absence of confounding effects 
during the event window (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). To address this limitation, I 
chose a short event window in keeping with the assumption of market efficiency. 
Furthermore, I reduced the possibility of alternative explanations by excluding 
announcements with confounding events. Second, although I examined stigma from 
alleged accounting scandals over a five year period, the data remains cross-sectional and 
precludes statements of causality between the dependent and independent variables. 
Third, I only focused on stigmatization of a firm by one stakeholder group, the investors. 
To the extent that other stakeholder groups also stigmatize associated firms, the results 
of this dissertation understate the extent of stigmatization that occurs for these firms. For 
instance, it is plausible that suppliers, customers, joint venture partners, or employees of 
an associated firm may subsequently disassociate themselves from the firm due to the 
stigma. The subsequent loss in human capital and business partners as well as the 
resulting decline in the market value of the associated firm would not have been fully 
captured if these other reactions did not take place on the same event dates used in this 
study. 
Future research may extend the current work in one of the following ways. First, 
I have restricted the scope of this dissertation to associations based on director 
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interlocks. Since firms may be associated through alternative channels such as strategic 
alliances, supplier-customer relations, or common industry membership, future research 
may broaden the scope of inquiry by examining stigmatization through other channels of 
association. For instance, when Enron was stigmatized as a result of adopting misleading 
account practices, other firms such as Dynegy or El Paso may also experience stigma as 
a result of common membership in the energy trading industry. An interesting research 
endeavor may be to examine whether different channels of association have a different 
impact on the amount of stigma experienced by an associated firm. Just as silver is a 
better conductor of electricity than copper, it is conceivable that some channels of 
association may result in greater stigmatization of an associated firm when compared 
with other channels. Second, future research may also examine whether the attribution of 
blame to the interlocking directors for the alleged accounting scandal may lead to 
potential settling up consequences such as reduced compensation, damaged reputation, 
or reduced employability of these directors in the future. Third, while this study has 
examined stigma by association in the context of accounting scandals, future research 
may examine stigma by association from other discrediting predicaments, such as 
corporate bankruptcy.  
Finally, although there is an abundance of research that examines a firm’s 
response strategy to a stigmatizing event, there is little research on response strategies to 
stigma by association. The public press has reported that firms do take actions to avoid 
the negative consequences of guilt by association because of their relationships with 
stigmatized firms (Karpovich, 2002; King, 1991). One possible response peculiar to the 
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management of stigma by associated firms is the act of terminating the association to 
stigmatized firms. For instance, Suchman states that “legitimation crises tend to become 
self reinforcing feedback loops, as social networks recoil to avoid guilt by 
association…the risk of negative contagion may drive even long-standing allies to 
disassociate themselves from a troubled counterpart and to engage in ritualistic sniping 
and ostracism” (1995: 597). Future research may examine the effectiveness of various 
strategies in mitigating the impact of stigma by association. Furthermore, given that 
stigma by association is a passive event which may be overlooked by top executives, 
another interesting research avenue will be to study the factors that determine the speed 
with which firms implement a response strategy to mitigate the negative consequences 
of such stigma. 
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APPENDIX 
List of Companies in the Sample 
 
Number Stigmatized firms Associated firms 
21ST CENTURY INSURANCE GROUP 
BAXTER INTERNATIONAL INC 
CONSOLIDATED EDISON INC 
J P MORGAN CHASE & CO 
T R W INC 
1 AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP 
INC 
 
TRANSATLANTIC HOLDINGS INC 
 
 
 
CHESAPEAKE BIOLOGICAL LABS INC 2 ANDRX CORP 
CYTOCLONAL PHARMACEUTICS INC 
 
 
 
A A R CORP 
BANDAG INC 
CLICK COMMERCE INC 
EXELON CORP 
G A T X CORP 
HELMERICH & PAYNE INC 
INFORTE CORPORATION 
MOLEX INC 
NISOURCE INC 
SKYLINE CORP 
3 AON CORP 
TRIBUNE COMPANY 
 
 
 
EDGE PETROLEUM CORP 
HIGHLANDS INSURANCE GROUP INC 
MOHAWK INDUSTRIES INC 
4 BREED TECHNOLOGIES INC 
NUEVO ENERGY CO 
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Number Stigmatized firms Associated firms 
APOGENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 
ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS INC 
CITIGROUP INC 
COMERICA INC 
CUMMINS ENGINE INC 
PAREXEL INTERNATIONAL CORP 
REPTRON ELECTRONICS INC 
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC 
SCHULMAN A INC 
STEELCASE INC 
STRYKER CORP 
UNISYS CORP 
WESCO INTERNATIONAL INC 
5 C M S ENERGY 
 
 
 
WHITMAN EDUCATION GROUP INC 
 
 
 
ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND CO 
BEAR STEARNS COS INC 
C S X CORP 
CAPITAL TRUST INC 
CORNERSTONE PROPERTIES INC 
FERROFLUIDICS CORP 
GENCORP INC 
INTERCHANGE FINANCIAL SRVCS CORP 
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS & FRAG INC 
MEGO FINANCIAL CORP 
MEGO MORTGAGE CORP 
N F O RESEARCH INC 
NEW JERSEY RESOURCES 
OMNICOM GROUP INC 
OPINION RESEARCH CORP 
QUEBECOR PRINTING INC 
RIDDELL SPORTS INC 
T B WOODS CORP 
6 CENDANT CORP 
WALLACE COMPUTER SERVICES INC 
 
 
 
DELPHI FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
MORTON INDUSTRIAL GROUP INC 
RECKSON ASSOCIATES REALTY CORP 
TOYS R US INC 
7 COMPUTER ASSOCIATES 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
TRANSWORLD HEALTHCARE INC 
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Number Stigmatized firms Associated firms 
AAIPHARMA INC 
ALLIED WASTE INDUSTRIES INC 
AUTONATION INC DEL 
BOCA RESORTS INC 
DANA CORP 
DELTA APPAREL INC 
DELTA WOODSIDE INDS INC 
EXTENDED STAY AMERICA INC 
EXXON MOBIL CORP 
GENERAL MILLS INC 
NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO 
PALOMAR MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES INC 
PHOENIX COS INC 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 
SOUTHTRUST CORP 
8 DUKE ENERGY CORP 
WACHOVIA CORP 
 
 
 
A M X CORP 
ALLSTATE CORP 
C V S CORP 
CAPITAL TRUST INC 
COOPER INDUSTRIES LTD 
EQUITY OFFICE PROPERTIES TRUST 
EQUITY RESIDENTIAL PROP TRUST 
IDINE REWARDS NETWORK INC 
LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP 
MANUFACTURED HOME COMMUNITIES 
PAC WEST TELECOMM INC 
9 DYNEGY INC 
VENTAS INC 
 
 
 
COX COMMUNICATIONS INC 10 EFUNDS CORP 
SMARTDISK CORP 
 
 
 
AMSOUTH BANCORPORATION 
C K E RESTAURANTS INC 
DUN & BRADSTREET CORP 
GALYANS TRADING CO INC 
HERCULES INC 
HUBBELL INC 
INGRAM MICRO INC 
PENN TRAFFIC CO 
PRAXAIR INC 
11 EL PASO CORP 
TRANSOCEAN SEDCO FOREX INC 
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Number Stigmatized firms Associated firms 
AMERICAN WATER WORKS INC 
BELO A H CORP 
J P MORGAN CHASE & CO 
MARSH & MCLENNAN COS INC 
PEPSICO INC 
12 ELECTRONIC DATA SYS CORP 
ROCKWELL AUTOMATION INC 
 
 
 
C C C INFORMATION SVCS GROUP INC 
CALIFORNIA WATER SERVICE CO 
GROUP 1 AUTOMOTIVE INC 
IMCLONE SYSTEMS INC 
LILLY ELI & CO 
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORP 
MOTOROLA INC 
NATCO GROUP INC 
NEWPOWER HOLDINGS INC 
OWENS CORNING 
13 ENRON CORP 
QUALCOMM INC 
 
 
 
AIRNET SYSTEMS INC 
ANSWERTHINK INC 
DANKA BUSINESS SYSTEMS PLC 
RYDER SYSTEMS INC 
14 ENTERASYS NETWORKS INC 
UNISYS CORP 
 
 
 
ANDERSONS INC 
ANTHEM INC 
CINCINNATI FINANCIAL CORP 
CINERGY CORP 
CINTAS CORP 
LIMITED INC 
STANDARD REGISTER CO 
STEELCASE INC 
15 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 
TRIBUNE COMPANY 
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AMBAC FINANCIAL GROUP INC 
EXPRESS SCRIPTS INC 
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS & FRAG INC 
PENNZOIL QUAKER STATE CO 
PITNEY BOWES INC 
16 INTERPUBLIC GROUP COS INC 
PRIMEDIA INC 
 
 
 
17 LANTRONIX INC QLOGIC CORP 
 
 
 
ALCOA INC 
AMERICAN EXPRESS CO 
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP INC 
CUMMINS ENGINE INC 
JOHNSON & JOHNSON 
NEW YORK TIMES CO 
NOVELL INC 
PEPSICO INC 
18 LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES INC 
SARA LEE CORP 
 
 
 
BECKMAN COULTER INC 
CELL GENESYS INC 
CHARLES RIVER LABS INTL INC 
COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC 
FORTUNE BRANDS INC 
FRANKLIN RESOURCES INC 
GENERAL MILLS INC 
J P MORGAN CHASE & CO 
MILLIPORE CORP 
19 MERCK & CO INC 
PUBLIC SERVICE ENTERPRISE GROUP 
 
 
 
ANDREW CORP 
B W A Y CORP 
BORGWARNER INC 
CATERPILLAR INC 
FIRST INDUSTRIAL REALTY TR INC 
NATIONAL FUEL GAS CO 
20 NICOR INC 
VALMONT INDUSTRIES INC 
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DIAMOND OFFSHORE DRILLING INC 
DRUGSTORE COM INC 
INCYTE GENOMICS INC 
N E O N SYSTEMS INC 
R C N CORP 
STERICYCLE INC 
21 PEREGRINE SYSTEMS 
VALERO ENERGY CORP 
 
 
 
ALLEGHENY TECHNOLOGIES 
AMERADA HESS CORP 
BLACKROCK INC 
CLOROX CO 
DOMINION RESOURCES INC 
EQUITABLE RESOURCES INC 
HEINZ H J CO 
HILB ROGAL & HAMILTON CO 
INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO 
MEDTRONIC INC 
P P G INDUSTRIES INC 
U S AIRWAYS GROUP INC 
VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 
22 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES 
WATER PIK TECHNOLOGIES 
 
 
 
ALARIS MEDICAL INC 
CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP 
FOREST OIL CORP 
JUNIPER NETWORKS INC 
MAIL WELL INC 
NORDSON CORP 
PEPSI BOTTLING GROUP INC 
PITNEY BOWES INC 
REDBACK NETWORKS INC 
SEALED AIR CORP 
23 QWEST COMMUNICATIONS 
INTERNATIONAL INC 
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP 
 
 
 
C N A FINANCIAL CORP 
FIREARMS TRAINING SYSTEMS INC 
LOEWS CORP 
MEDITRUST CORP 
SEQUA CORP 
TRIARC COMPANIES INC 
UNITED RENTALS INC 
24 RITE AID CORP 
ZENITH NATIONAL INSURANCE CORP 
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A S A LTD 
CLEVELAND CLIFFS INC 
25 STILLWATER MINING CO 
MERIDIAN GOLD INC 
 
 
 
CIRCON CORP 
NUEVO ENERGY CO 
26 SUNBEAM CORP 
VALASSIS COMMUNICATIONS INC 
 
 
 
CHATTEM INC 
COCA COLA CO 
COCA COLA ENTERPRISES INC 
CRAWFORD & CO 
DAN RIVER INC GA 
DIMON INC 
DOVER DOWNS ENTERTAINMENT INC 
EQUIFAX INC 
F P L GROUP INC 
FLOWERS INDUSTRIES INC 
GENUINE PARTS CO 
GEORGIA PACIFIC CORP 
HARLAND JOHN H CO 
HAVERTY FURNITURE COS INC 
HUGHES SUPPLY INC 
POE & BROWN INC 
PROTECTIVE LIFE CORP 
PROVIDENT LIFE & ACC INS CO AMER 
R P C INC 
ROCK TENN CO 
ROLLINS INC 
SEARS ROEBUCK & CO 
SOUTHERN CO 
27 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 
TORCHMARK CORP 
 
 
 
28 TAKE TWO INTERACTIVE 
SOFTWARE INC 
ANDERSEN GROUP INC 
 
 
 
A R V ASSISTED LIVING INC 
JONES APPAREL GROUP INC 
29 TENET HEALTHCARE 
NORTHEAST UTILITIES 
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MERITAGE CORPORATION 
QUESTAR CORP 
RIGHTCHOICE MANAGED CARE INC 
SKYWEST INC 
30 ZIONS BANCORP 
TENNECO AUTOMOTIVE INC 
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